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Abstract
We investigate women’s fertility, labor and marriage market responses to large declines in
child mortality. We find delayed childbearing, with lower intensive and extensive margin fertility,
a decline in the chances of ever having married, increased labor force participation and an
improvement in occupational status. This constitutes the first evidence that improvements in
child survival allow women to start fertility later and invest more in the labor market. We
present a new theory of fertility that incorporates dynamic choices and reconciles our findings
with existing models of behavior.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates fertility, labor market and marriage market responses to sharp declines
in child mortality and morbidity occasioned by a medical innovation. We find that a sharp drop
in pneumonia mortality risk in infancy created by the introduction of antibiotics in 1937 in the
United States is associated with lower fertility at both the intensive and the extensive margins. We
outline a model that can explain this, augmenting the classical quality-quantity model of fertility
with a dynamic process for childbearing that takes account of women’s labor market opportunities.
Women in the model choose the timing of fertility, but must leave the labor market after their
first pregnancy, consistent with the cultural norms of the 1930s. We characterize how the trade
off between early and delayed fertility depends on the rate of child mortality. Consistent with
the predictions of this model, we find that women delay childbearing, are less likely to have ever
married, more likely to work and to have higher occupational scores (a measure of the skill intensity
of employment).
Ours is the first attempt to analyze, within a single framework, how child mortality may modify
the timing of birth, childlessness, the number of children, labor force participation and marriage.
In contrast to previous studies that focus on one or the other, we take into account both the child
quality versus quantity trade-off, and the family versus career trade-off. In particular, relative
to Becker and Lewis (1973) and models that build on it (e.g. Galor 2012, Soares 2005, Aaronson,
Lange, and Mazumder 2014, Kalemli-Ozcan 2003), we add a third dimension to the quantity-quality
trade-off, namely fertility timing, the other side of which is labor market participation.
Our key insight is that innovations that affect the relative prices of child quantity and quality
may also affect the disposable time of women, leading them to delay fertility and participate in
the labor market. Child mortality decline implies that women need fewer pregnancies in order
to achieve their target number of children, and that the target number is likely to decline due to
a reduction in the price of having a higher quality child. This encourages fertility delay, which
makes it more attractive to invest in the labor market. This can have knock on effects: it becomes
unnecessary to marry early and any of positive shocks to wage earnings, learning about the benefits
of work, or declines in the biological ability to have children with age can shift the opportunity cost
of childbearing and lead to permanent childlessness.1
Contribution to the literature Although the transition to low fertility is central in theories
of economic growth (Galor and Weil 1996), the drivers of the fertility transition remain hotly
1Four forces are likely to be at play here. First, the direct effect of more births surviving will lower replacement
behavior in fertility. Second, it will tend to reduce hoarding behaviour that arises because mortality is uncertain.
Third, because declines in mortality are typically associated with declines in morbidity (and thus an improved child
health endowment), there is an increase in the incentive to invest in child quality, which will tend to reduce the target
(desired) number of children as long as the effect of a reduction in the price of child quantity does not dominate.
Fourth, a decline in sickness rates and hence the need to care for sick children will also tend to release the time
of women for labor market engagement. Evidence of replacement and hoarding effects is provided in Bhalotra and
van Soest (2008) using data from India from a period with broadly similar exposure to infectious diseases including
pneumonia.
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debated (Galor 2012). In a seminal paper, Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014) propose that
distinguishing extensive and intensive margin fertility responses permits discrimination between
competing theories of the demographic transition. Their main insight is that, in the Becker and
Lewis (1973) quantity-quality model of fertility, child quality and child quantity are substitutes on
the intensive margin, but complements on the extensive margin. In particular, their model implies
that when a change in the opportunity cost of women’s time is the dominant driver, the two margins
will move together. In contrast, when changes in the price of child quality (proxied by a school
building program) are the dominant driver, the two margins will move in opposite directions. They
demonstrate this by estimating impacts of school construction on fertility.2
We provide the first analysis of extensive vs intensive margin fertility responses to declines in
mortality and morbidity. In contrast to the predictions of Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014),
we find lower fertility on both margins. Our explanation for this difference is that changes in the
price of child quality can directly influence the opportunity cost of women’s time. We capture
our hypothesis in a model that extends Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014) and Becker and
Lewis (1973) to allow fertility to be a dynamic choice variable determined jointly with labor force
participation. By allowing changes in the price of child quality to directly influence the opportunity
cost of women’s time, we consider together the two forces often posited as competing explanations
of the demographic transition: increases in the opportunity cost of women’s time and improvements
in child survival.
By drawing a new, causal link between child mortality decline and increases in women’s la-
bor force participation and childlessness, we provide a new theory of drivers of childlessness that
contributes to an active literature in this area (Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi 2019, Baudin,
de la Croix, and Gobbi 2015, Gobbi 2013, Currie and Schwandt 2014, Ananat, Gruber, and Levine
2007).3 Our key finding that child mortality decline encourages fertility delay and higher rates of
women’s labor force participation augments research on the interplay between fertility and women’s
careers (Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen 2017, Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens 2017, Jensen 2012,
Albanesi and Olivetti 2014, Albanesi and Olivetti 2016, Goldin and Katz 2002, Goldin 1997), and
on fertility timing (de la Croix and Pommeret 2018, Herr 2016, Choi 2017, Ananat and Hungerman
2012). Our contribution here is to identify child mortality decline as a factor driving both fertility
delay and women’s labor force participation.
Previous work has linked fertility delay to marriage and labor market incentives (Caucutt,
Guner, and Knowles 2002), but not to falling child mortality. A related literature has documented
the liberating influences of the expansion of women’s education and the introduction of the birth
control pill, which enabled fertility delay, later marriage, and labor force participation (Goldin and
Katz 2002, Goldin 2006, Bailey 2006); we show that child mortality decline had similar liberating
2They use a triple difference approach, modeling fertility of black relative to white women in response to the
Rosenwald programme that created schools for blacks in the 1920s.
3Recent models of childlessness suggest that involuntary childlessness at the bottom of the education distribution
arises from poverty, while childlessness at the upper end of the education distribution is voluntary, being driven by
the opportunity cost of childbearing (Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi 2015, also see Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder
2014 in relation to the opportunity cost mechanism).
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effects.4 There were dramatic increases in women’s labor force participation in the mid-20th century,
which have been associated with the high school movement and the emergence of more woman-
friendly jobs (Goldin 2006); we propose child mortality decline as another contributing channel. In
fact, we also find that sulfa drugs increased high school completion.
Model of fertility timing and labor market choices Our model extends the classical quantity-
quality model of fertility choices. As in the existing literature following Becker and Lewis (1973),
we assume that women have preferences over the quality of children, quantity of children and other
consumption. We extend the classical model to a dynamic environment, which introduces two novel
features relative to the existing framework, which are realistic to our study period.
First, the quantity of children is not perfectly controllable, but is subject to the risk of child
mortality. Second, there is an inherent trade off between the quantity of children and the woman’s
ability to earn income. At each date in her period of fertility, a woman chooses whether to work
for a wage or to get pregnant.
The key trade off in this model is as follows: Leaving the labor market early increases the
number of pregnancies the woman can attempt. With more attempts, she is more likely to achieve
the number of children that maximizes her utility, despite the risk of child mortality. On the other
hand, leaving the labor market early reduces the woman’s expected lifetime income and, therefore,
the resources available for consumption and child quality.
We characterize women’s optimal choices as a function of the rate λ of child mortality. Our
model predicts that, for a realistic range of parameters, a decline in λ encourages women to delay
their fertility and remain in the labor market for longer. This feature leads to a novel prediction:
if enough women in the population switch from early to delayed fertility, then the total probability
of childlessness in the population increases after a beneficial health shock that decreases λ, and
the number of children on the intensive margin decreases. Importantly, the prediction of increased
childlessness stands in contrast to the prediction of a classical quantity-quality model. It can be
used to directly test for the importance of dynamic effects. We establish these results both for an
illustrative model with three periods and for a general dynamic environment. We also demonstrate
that these predictions are robust across a range of extensions to the baseline model.
Empirical strategy and effect sizes Identification exploits the fact that the introduction of
the first antibiotics, sulfa drugs, led to a trend break in pneumonia mortality in 1937. Mortality
declined more in states with higher baseline rates. We leverage these cross-cohort and cross-state
patterns in a difference-in-difference strategy similar to that used in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007),
Ager, Hansen, and Jensen (2017), Bleakley (2007), Bhalotra and Venkataramani (2015) and Gollin,
Hansen, and Wingender (2021).
4In contrast to our findings, the pill had no impact on completed fertility at either margin (Ananat and Hungerman
2012). A possible explanation for this difference is that women in the antibiotic era were more likely to have to
choose between career and family, while women in the pill era could more easily have both (Goldin 2004, Coles and
Francesconi 2018).
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Modelling the fertility timing of women giving birth in a window around the 1937 event, we
find that a representative interquartile decline in pneumonia mortality led to a 0.6 percentage point
(6.9%) reduction in the annual probability of birth, and a 0.3 percentage point (5.9%) reduction
in the annual probability of becoming a mother (extensive margin). We then track mothers of the
sulfa era in later census files to study total fertility, with a view to identifying tempo effects and
effects on the distribution of the number of children per woman. Plugging in the same reduction in
pneumonia mortality and considering women who are still in their childbearing years at the time
of census interview, we identify a 4.6 percentage point increase in the probability of childlessness
(12.8% of baseline), and 0.18 fewer (net) children conditional on at least one (7% of the baseline
mean of 2.61). Considering the same cohorts of women at age 40-50, by when they will have
completed their fertility, we find that the impact of mortality decline on childlessness is reduced by
two thirds, indicating significant delay effects in the childbearing sample. Analysing changes in the
distribution of fertility, we observe statistically significant responses at the two ends, with women
being more likely to be childless and less likely to have three or more children.
Turning to labor market outcomes, we find that, in response to pneumonia mortality decline,
the probability of women’s labor force participation increased by 2.6 percentage points (7%), oc-
cupational scores increased by 6.6 percentage points, and women worked more hours (1.15 hours
more per week). Importantly, we find that child mortality decline increased the joint probability
that a woman was both childless and in the labor force by 13% of the baseline probability (20.5%),
and this increase was driven entirely by a decline in the number of women who were stay-at-home
mothers. The estimated impacts on marriage rates are smaller, with the chances of being ever-
married declining by 1.5 percentage points (1.7%), indicating that marriage was one, but not a key,
pathway.
Identification challenges and specification tests We demonstrate the robustness of our find-
ings to several coherence and specification checks. The main threat to identification is differential
pre-trends in outcomes between states with higher versus lower disease burdens in the pre-sulfa era.
We scrutinize trends in an event study-style specification, and investigate stability of the results to
controls for relevant time-varying covariates and unobservable trends. Following Pei, Pischke, and
Schwandt (2018), we also conduct a balance test using these covariates and, similar to Aaronson,
Lange, and Mazumder (2014), we estimate impacts of a placebo intervention. Identification is aided
by the fact that sulfa drugs were only effective for certain antibacterial infections - for example,
they were effective in treating pneumonia but not diseases such as tuberculosis, which had similar
risk factors. We show that our findings are not driven by potentially confounding events, including
the Second World War which encouraged women’s labor force participation (Acemoglu, Autor, and
Lyle 2004, Goldin and Olivetti 2013), New Deal spending and the Dust Bowl. We also show that the
results are not explained by mean reversion, the introduction of prescription charges, measurement
error in pneumonia mortality, survivorship bias, sample selection or endogenous migration, and
we discuss potential concerns over measurement of fertility and measurement of pneumonia. We
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present evidence that women did have access to fertility control in this early era, so that they could
alter the timing of their births and, to allow for selection into uptake, we estimate a specification
conditional on woman fixed effects.
Broader relevance We confirm that the relationships between child mortality decline and child-
lessness, total fertility and women’s labor force participation that we identify are also evident as
stylized facts in contemporary data for developing countries. This underlines the broad scope of
our theoretical model and empirical findings.
Pneumonia is the leading cause of death among children today, and 6 million under-5 children
continue to die every year (Liu et al. 2016). While eighty years have elapsed since the innovation of
antibiotics, the average consumption of antibiotics in West Africa is approximately 90% lower than
in the United States, despite much higher rates of infectious disease, marking poor access (Hogberg
et al. 2014). Our findings suggest that a benefit of policies that reduce child mortality is that they
can “liberate” women from early childbearing and multiple pregnancies and the disempowerment
that often accompanies this practice. There is considerable variation in women’s rates of labour
force participation across countries, conditional upon income. While uneven access to childcare is
a potential explanation in OECD countries (Olivetti and Petrongelo 2017), our results suggest that
uneven child survival rates may be a potential explanation in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the disease environment in
the 1930s and the event of introduction of the first antibiotics. Section 3 describes the empirical
strategy, data, results and robustness checks for fertility during the sulfa era. Motivated by the
extensive margin result, Section 4 outlines a theoretical model that rationalizes the link between
child mortality decline, fertility timing and labor force participation, and drives predictions for
completed fertility, childlessness and labor market outcomes. Section 5 presents the empirical
strategy and results for these later life outcomes. Section 6 discusses external validity and Section
7 concludes.
2 Context
2.1 Mortality Rates and Sulfa Drugs
The United States in the 20th century was characterized by high levels of mortality (Britten 1942,
Linder and Grove 1947). The arrival of the first antibiotics - sulphonamides, or sulfa drugs - in
1937 drastically altered the standard of medical care, creating large and sharp changes in morbidity
and mortality from several bacterial infections. Sulfa drugs were discovered by German chemists
experimenting with textile dyes in 1932 and they became available in the United States starting
in 1937, achieving wide penetration in the consumer pharmaceuticals market (Lesch 2007). This
was enabled by low costs (especially for a life-saving drug), the lack of prescription requirements
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to purchase the drugs (which were established only in 1939), and the lack of a binding patent.5 By
all accounts, there was a ”sulfa craze”, with adoption being widespread and quick (Lerner 1991).
Sulfa drugs were particularly effective in treating pneumonia among children, which was pre-
viously managed by supportive care (Jayachandran, Lleras-Muney, and Smith 2010).6 Pneumonia
was the leading infectious cause of child morbidity and mortality, and the third leading cause over-
all (after death from premature birth and congenital defects), accounting for 17% of infant deaths
in the United States in the 1930s. Mortality rates from pneumonia are U-shaped in age. Child
mortality from pneumonia (under-5s) in the United States stood at an average of 11.8 per 1000
population between 1930-36 (pre-sulfa), and most deaths occurred among infants. The under-1
pneumonia mortality rate was 8.2 per 1000 live births, while the adult rate for the same period
was 0.4 per 1000 people (also see Figure 1 which plots mortality rates by age per 1000 population).
Both the level and the trend in the all-age pneumonia mortality rate was dominated by the infant
rate.
In addition to reducing mortality, the arrival of sulfa drugs led to significant reductions in
morbidity (Greengard et al. 1943, Hodes et al. 1939, Moody and Knouf 1940). Prior to the
introduction of antibiotics, pneumonia was a debilitating disease with typical spells often lasting
39 days on average, and children tending to have recurrent spells (Britten 1942). Sulfa drugs
reduced the severity and length of these episodes (Connolly et al. 2012), and this was documented
in clinical trials among hospital inpatients (Greengard et al. 1943, Moody and Knouf 1940). A
reduction in pneumonia morbidity among children thus considerably increased the disposable time
of women, who were the main care-givers for children and the sick. By strengthening the infant
health endowment, it will have also led parents to move along the quantity-quality indifference
curve, trading up quantity in favour of quality. Consistent with this (and despite negative selection
into survival following the positive shock of antibiotic access), children born after 1937 who survived
to adulthood had significantly better indicators of educational attainment, employment, income,
and lower disability (Bhalotra and Venkataramani 2015). This is a marker of the substantive
importance of pneumonia mortality decline among children born in the sulfa era and a result that
is consistent with our finding of a decline in intensive margin fertility.7
2.2 Fertility and Fertility Control in Early Twentieth Century America
Between 1910 and the mid 1920s, the average number of children per woman stood between 3 and
3.5. Fertility thereafter fell during the Great Depression (to 2.5 children per woman) but rose during
5The chemical structure of sulfonamide had previously been documented as part of a PhD thesis in the early
1900s. By the time it was established in the 1930s that it had antibacterial properties, the patent had expired and
anyone was allowed to produce sulfonamide for commercial purposes.
6Sulfa drugs also reduced mortality and morbidity from skin and soft tissue infections and meningitis (Jayachan-
dran, Lleras-Muney, and Smith 2010). However, the incidence of these diseases was very low and they made insignif-
icant contributions to mortality rates. For example, the all-age mortality rate from skin diseases in the U.S. was 1.8
per 1000 in 1930, and from meningitis 2.1, compared to an all-cause infant mortality rate of 69 (Vital Statistics).
7Following a tradition in the literature (Almond 2006, Bozzoli, Deaton, and Quintana-Domeque 2009), we assume
that changes in mortality are a proxy for both mortality and morbidity, both of which improved due to the arrival of
sulfa drugs. In this sense, mortality decline also captures improvements in the health of survivors.
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World War II and the post-War (Baby Boom) period (1945-late 1950s). Over this period, there is
evidence that women born in the early 20th century were able and willing to practise fertility control
(Morgan 1991).8 Before the arrival of the birth control pill in the 1960s, couples used diaphragms,
latex condoms, vaginal suppositories, withdrawal and douching techniques (Engelman 2011), with
the invention of the diaphragm in 1882 being particularly crucial to the advent of effective fertility
control by women.9
2.3 Trends in Women’s Labor Force Participation and Marriage
In the 1930s, there was a substantial increase in female labor force participation; for example,
there was an increase of 15.5 percentage points, from 10% to 25%, on the extensive margin among
married women (Goldin 2006). Marriage and fertility choices were closely related in this period,
with only 8.5% of births being out of wedlock (Bachu 1999). 10 Previous work has argued that
important drivers of the increase in labor force participation in this period included higher rates of
high school completion, the arrival of “nice” jobs, such as secretarial work in offices that reduced
the stigma associated with married women working, and the virtual elimination of marriage bars by
the early 1940s.11 Regardless of education, most working women were engaged in typing-oriented
jobs and teaching (Goldin 2006).
3 Birth Timing
This Section presents the data, empirical specification, results and an extensive series of robustness
checks for analysis of impacts of antibiotic exposure on birth timing among women who were of
reproductive age when the antibiotics first became available. As indicated earlier, we find that
the antibiotic-led decline in pneumonia mortality resulted in a decline in fertility on both the
intensive and the extensive margins. As the extensive margin result is contrary to the predictions
of Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder 2014, we develop an extension of their model in Section 4
which is consistent with our result. Our model generates predictions for the impact of mortality
decline on childlessness, the labour market and marriage outcomes, which we investigate in Section
5.
8The early 20th century in the U.S. featured the birth control movement, led by political radicals Emma Goldman,
Mary Dennett and Margaret Sanger, who argued the importance of birth control. The first birth control clinic was
opened in 1916, but shut down, followed by a clinic in 1923, which was not shut down. These clinics were the
precursor to Planned Parenthood.
9The relationship between fertility control and career choices has been discussed in sociology, for example see Wilkie
(1981), Hayford (2013), Lundquist, Budig, Curtis, and Teachman (2009), Bloom and Trussell (1984). In particular,
see Murray and Lagger (2001), who analyze this in the context of the United States demographic transition in the
19th century.
10In 1936, a year before the introduction of sulfa drugs, Popenoe (1936) conducted a survey among students at the
University of Southern California asking them to describe the history of all permanently childless couples that they
knew. This shows that 22% of couples were believed to be childless due to the wife’s career, and 16% childless due to
economic pressure, suggesting that fertility and labor market choices were linked during this period, even for married
women.
11Marriage bars were regulations that prevented married women from working - see Goldin (2006).
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3.1 Data
Data on individual outcomes are taken from the United States Census Microdata (Ruggles et al.
2010). Appendix A describes the data in more detail, including sources and variable definitions.
Below we discuss the birth and mortality data.
Birth timing data To model fertility during the sulfa era we use pooled census microdata using
the 1940 and 1950 1% samples.12 We select women who were of childbearing age (15-40) at any time
between 1930 and 1943 and expand the data to create a woman-level panel, with observations for
every year in which a woman was at risk of giving birth. We only include woman-year observations
in which a woman was aged 15-40 in that year, so that we capture choices during the fertile period.
Thus, the cohorts in the ”birth hazard sample” were born in the years 1890-1928.
We use a measure of net fertility that derives from a record of the children living in the mother’s
household at the time of enumeration.13 Using a variable that links child records to mothers, we
constructed a complete history of live births for each woman, restricting births to biological births
(95% of children in the household) that occurred in the U.S. As is standard, this measure excludes
any pregnancies that did not result in live births, and any deaths that occurred after birth but
before the census. It also excludes any children that had left home. The latest census we use is the
1950 census, where the oldest child born during the estimation period 1930-1943 would have been
20, which minimises concerns about missing older children. In Section 3.4, we discuss estimates
that measure fertility using only information on children under the age of 10 at the time of the
census.
Mortality rate data We gathered data on diseases treatable with sulfa drugs and also for
diseases that were not treatable, and that thus act as placebos. These data are from several volumes
of the U.S. Vital Statistics (Grove and Hetzel 1968, Linder and Grove 1947, Ruggles et al. 2010,
Bureau 1943). We create the pre-intervention or baseline levels of cause-specific mortality rates
as the state-level average over the years 1930-36 of the mortality rate, which allows us to smooth
over fluctuations in the rate created by influenza epidemics. There are no annual time series data
in this era for pneumonia mortality. Instead, the vital statistics data contain the mortality rate
from pneumonia and influenza combined. This is because the two diseases shared symptoms such
as cough and fever, making them difficult to distinguish. Moreover, they were intrinsically related
since pneumonia often followed as the more serious development of an initial influenza infection.
Importantly for our purposes, because influenza is viral, it was not treatable with sulfa drugs but
pneumonia, which includes a bacterial strain, was. Thus a sulfa-driven decline in the combined
12In all datasets, we restrict the sample to US born women not residing in group quarters who are resident in their
birth state at the time of the census. The latter limits bias that could arise due to migration; see Section 3.4 for
robustness checks on migration.
13In theories of population increase and economic growth, the focus is on the number of surviving children a woman
has, or net fertility (Acemoglu and Johnson 2007, Brueckner and Schwandt 2015). Women looking to achieve a target
number of births will also set the target in net terms (Galor 2012).
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influenza-pneumonia mortality rate reflects a decline in pneumonia mortality. Henceforth, for ease
of exposition, we refer to this combined rate as pneumonia mortality.
We found decadal data that provide separate series for pneumonia and influenza to strengthen
faith in this approach. First, these data show that pneumonia dominated the combined mortality
rate, being responsible for 8.9 deaths per 1000 in 1930, compared to 1.3 deaths per 1000 live
births from influenza. Second, the decline in the combined mortality rate between 1930 and 1940
was entirely on account of a decline in the pneumonia mortality rate: influenza rates fluctuated
considerably with epidemics and seasons, but the average influenza rate was steady across the
decade.
In a similar vein, we use the all-age pneumonia and influenza mortality rate on the grounds
that both the level and the trend are driven by the infant rate. Infant births and deaths, the two
components required to calculate infant and child mortality rates, were known to be under-reported
in this era (Linder and Grove 1947, Eriksson, Niemesh, and Thomasson 2017), making the child
rate noisier than the all-age rate. In addition, underreporting may have been more prominent in
the Southeastern U.S., where rates of pneumonia were higher on average, and this could result
in systematic measurement error (Ewbank 1987). We will show that infant and child pneumonia
mortality was the overwhelming source of variation in the all-age rate. In Section 3.4, we also show
that our estimates are robust to using the all-age rate as an instrumental variable for the more
noisily measured child rate.
Summary statistics Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics. The
woman-year observations are balanced before and after the intervention, with an annual mean
probability of birth of 8.7%. All-age pneumonia and influenza mortality before the intervention
was on average 1.09 per 1000 population.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We begin by documenting the ”first stage” impacts of the introduction of sulfa antibiotics on
pneumonia mortality, demonstrating a nationwide trend break in 1937, and that this was larger in
states with higher baseline rates of pneumonia mortality. As a result, the introduction of sulfa drugs
drove convergence in pneumonia mortality across states. We then describe an empirical strategy
that identifies the impact of sulfa drugs on fertility timing.
Trend break in pneumonia mortality The timing of the introduction of antibiotics created
sharp variation across cohorts in exposure to pneumonia, a disease treatable with sulfa drugs.
Figure 2 shows trend breaks in pneumonia mortality in 1937. Pneumonia mortality declined on
average 11.1% per year from 1937: see Table A.4 that shows the coefficients in regressions of changes
in level and log pneumonia pre- and post-sulfa. This per-year decline in pneumonia mortality was
driven entirely by the infant and child rate, while the adult and elderly rates exhibited a modest
annual increase between 1937 and 1943. Most deaths from pneumonia occur in infancy, when
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the immune system is still fragile, and the steepest post-sulfa decline in pneumonia mortality was
amongst infants and young children.14
State convergence in pneumonia mortality There was considerable geographic dispersion
in pre-intervention levels of pneumonia mortality (Figure A.2 in Appendix C.1). Because sulfa
drugs led to larger declines in pneumonia in states where the pre-intervention burden was higher,
we see post-sulfa convergence in pneumonia mortality rates across the U.S. states, and that this
convergence was most marked for children and infants (Figure 3).15
Estimating equation for birth timing Identification exploits these two features of the antibi-
otic revolution - the post-1937 decline in mortality rates and the large variation across U.S. states
in pre-intervention levels of the disease burden, in a difference-in-difference design similar to that
in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Bleakley (2007), Ager, Hansen, and Jensen (2017) and Bhalotra
and Venkataramani (2015). The event of the nationwide introduction of sulfa drugs in 1937 was
plausibly exogenous, being the direct result of scientific innovation. However, the identifying as-
sumption of parallel counterfactual trends in fertility in states with higher vs lower pre-1937 levels
of pneumonia merits scrutiny. We elaborate our approach to this below.
We analyse births in a short window around 1937, namely 1930-1943. This limits the role of
confounding events, such as the influenza epidemic of 1928-9 and the increasingly widespread use
of penicillin after 1943. We restrict the sample to women of reproductive age (and hence at risk
of birth) during this period. Using longitudinal birth history data for these women, we estimate
impacts of the discrete event of antibiotic availability on birth timing (the probability that a given
woman gives birth in a given year). The estimation equation is:
Pr(Yjsctr = 1) = α0 + α1 ∗ prePneumonias ∗ post1937t (1)
+α2 ∗ preMMRs ∗ post1937t + statecontrolss ∗ post1937t
+birthorderjt + timesincelastbirthjt + racej + educj
+θt × regionr + κs + ϕc + εjsctr,
where Yjsctr is a binary indicator that equals 1 if woman j born in state s, census region r
and cohort c, gave birth in year t and zero otherwise. The variable post1937t equals one if the
potential birth year of the child is 1937 or after and zero otherwise, as 1937 marks the nation-
14The uptick in the combined influenza plus pneumonia mortality rate on account of an influenza epidemic in
1936-1937 results in the decline after 1937 being sharper, but some of this reflects reversion to the mean. Comparison
of the post-1937 rates with the rates in 1930-1934 in the plot makes even clearer that mortality decline after 1937
was driven by the child mortality rate. In the analysis, we address the uptick in 1936-1937 by defining baseline rates
as an average over 1930-1936 and we also provide a test of whether our estimates are driven by mean reversion.
15This is formalized with tests of significance in Table A.4. The estimated convergence coefficient for pneumonia
mortality is -0.29, implying that a sulfa-led decline in pneumonia mortality equivalent to an interquartile shift in
the pre-intervention pneumonia mortality distribution (-0.26) was associated with a 7.5% reduction in pneumonia
mortality.
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wide introduction of antibiotics. prePneumonias is the 1930-1936 (baseline) average state level
pneumonia mortality rate. The coefficient of interest is α1, which captures the causal effect of the
antibiotic-led pneumonia mortality decline on the probability of birth. We estimate equation (1)
as a logistic regression, yielding estimates for a discrete time proportional hazard model. Standard
errors are clustered at the birth state level to account for serial correlation in outcomes within
states (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
The equation includes indicator variables for years since last birth with the count starting
at age 15 and restarting after every birth (timesincelastbirthjt), and indicator variables for the
birth order of the next birth (birthorderjt). We include fixed effects for the woman’s race (racej),
education (educationj), birth state (κs) and birth year (ϕc). The other, state-level control variables
are discussed below. Education will in part capture potential wages and fertility preferences. In a
robustness check, we also allow for woman fixed effects, which will capture any unobservables that
determine compliance and are potentially correlated with fertility preferences.
Extensive and intensive margins of fertility In order to distinguish between the extensive
and intensive margins of fertility timing, we estimate Equation (1) on subsets of the sample where
we only include woman-year observations in which the woman is at risk of giving birth to her first
child (extensive margin), and then to observations where the woman is at risk of giving birth to
her second or higher-order child (intensive margin).
Identifying assumptions The main threat to identification is that the variable prePneumonias
captures not just baseline pneumonia but also other state-level variation in pre-sulfa conditions that
are correlated with both pneumonia and the outcome (fertility). The likely candidate confounders
are the disease epidemiology of the state and economic development. For the first, we leverage the
fact that sulfa drugs were able to treat some diseases and not others to identify a set of placebo
diseases which we control for. For the second, we assimilated data on indicators of income, health
and education spending, infrastructure and women’s labour market position and condition on these.
Each of these variables is included as its pre-intervention value interacted with an indicator for post-
intervention cohorts (statecontrolss ∗ post1937t). This sharpens the test as it allows structural
breaks in the controls to coincide with the structural break in pneumonia in 1937. The baseline
model includes these controls. In extensions shown as specification checks, we (a) drop all of
these controls to assess sensitivity of the estimates to them and, (b) run a far more demanding
specification in which each state variable is interacted with a full set of year fixed effects rather
than with the dummy variable post1937t.
Tuberculosis (TB) and diarrhea were highly prevalent infectious diseases that act as natural
placebos. TB is a respiratory disease similar to pneumonia in causes but not treatable with sulfa
drugs. Diarrhea was also not treatable with sulfa, and it stood alongside pneumonia as a leading
cause of death of infants.16 We also control for malaria, another communicable disease as, in this
16For diarrhea we use the mortality rate for children under the age of two, given both data availability considerations
and the fact that adults typically do not die of diarrheal infections. For other control diseases we use the all-age rate.
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era, there were state-specific interventions including sanitation, housing and public health programs
targeting malaria. We control for mortality rates from cancer and heart disease, the main non-
communicable diseases, in order to capture changes in health care quality and access, allowing for
state-specific expansion of hospital care. Together, these five placebo diseases control for the state
level disease environment.
To distinguish sulfa-driven convergence in pneumonia mortality rates from an underlying process
of economic convergence we control for the logarithms of per capita state income, public health
spending, education spending, and the numbers of schools, hospitals and physicians, women’s
literacy and women’s labor force participation.17
We address common concerns with controls for observables. First, to allow for the possibility
that the underlying confounders are poorly measured (e.g. state income may not fully capture
economic development), we follow Pei, Pischke, and Schwandt (2018) and perform a version of a
balance test, which involves regressing each of the state-level economic and disease variables on
the sulfa exposure variables. Second, we additionally allow for unobservable trends by including
census region * year fixed effects (θt × regionr) in the baseline model. These control flexibly, for
example, for regional differences in impacts of the recession of 1937-38. In alternative specifications,
we include finer-grained census division * year fixed effects and state-specific linear trends. As a
specification check, we also directly estimate pre-sulfa trends in high vs low pneumonia states
and show that they are not statistically significantly different. Third, we estimate impacts of a
placebo intervention using an approach similar to that in Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014).
Fourth, to address the possibility of mean reversion, we control for the state-level pre-sulfa average
of the outcome variable. Finally, we scrutinize pre-trends and dynamic impacts in event study
style models. The event study models show pre-event trends, the dynamic evolution of post-event
impacts, and they naturally provide validation of the timing of the event.
Coincident events Even if the identifying assumption of parallel counterfactual trends holds,
we need to be sure that we do not capture impacts of other events that happened to coincide
with the introduction of sulfa drugs. We already address this in allowing impacts of the thirteen
state-time varying controls to break in 1937. If there were a policy or other event that occurred in
1937 - for instance a sharp change in income or in a placebo disease - and if this change impacted
fertility, our estimates are conditional upon this (though to explain our findings this change would
need to vary systematically with the pre-1937 level of pneumonia mortality).
Our baseline model also controls for a trend break in maternal mortality in 1937 that was the
result of sulfa drugs being able to treat puerperal sepsis (variable preMMRs in equation (1) above).
This is an ascending bacterial infection of the reproductive tract that can occur soon after birth
(Thomasson and Treber 2008) and that accounted for 40% of the 6.4 maternal deaths per 1000
live births in 1930 (Vital Statistics). The maternal mortality rate declined by around 10% per year
17For female labor force participation and literacy, we use the value in 1930 as values for other years are unavailable.
In a robustness check we also control for baseline occupational structure at the state level, to allow that women’s
employment opportunities were restricted by the availability of occupation.
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after 1937 and, in principle, this may have directly influenced the outcomes we study.18
In additional specification checks, we account for impacts of the main historical events of the
time including World War 2, the Great Depression and New Deal spending, and the Dust Bowl,
demonstrating that our results continue to hold.
Measurement issues In the first half of the twentieth century the states joined the U.S. Vital
Statistics registration system in different years, resulting in variation in the quality of birth and
death data (Eriksson, Niemesh, and Thomasson 2017). To address this, we consistently include in
the baseline model the years that each state entered the U.S. Vital Statistics birth registration and
death registration systems, interacted with the measure of sulfa exposure.
As indicated earlier, in line with IV measurement error models (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994),
we also investigate replacing the all-age pneumonia rate with the child rate, using the all-age rate
as an instrument.
In assigning pre-intervention mortality rates and state-level controls to women, we use their birth
state because migration decisions after birth are potentially endogenous. We also omit migrants
in the main specification. As a result, we may underestimate treatment effects for women who
moved into areas with the largest health gains. To investigate this further, we re-estimate the
equation assigning all state-level variables to the resident state of the woman at the time of census
enumeration, and also instrumenting state of residence mortality decline with birth state mortality
decline - see the discussion in Section 3.4, where we also discuss modelling migration as an outcome
and find no evidence of endogenous migration. Among other robustness checks we investigate
sensitivity to age at census sample, and to removing outlier states. We show that the significance
of the estimates is robust to a multiple hypothesis testing correction. In Section 3.4, we also discuss
and assess our measure of fertility, checking for any bias induced by counting only children at home.
Woman fixed effects and other specification checks As we created longitudinal data on
births within women, we can assess changes in the probability of birth for a given woman post- vs
pre-sulfa, conditional on her age. We do this by including woman fixed effects in the model in a
robustness check. This takes care of any concerns over unobservables that (endogenously) determine
selective uptake of sulfa drugs for pneumonia and are correlated with fertility preferences. While
the baseline model is estimated as a logistic regression, we show that estimating equation (1) as an
OLS regression produces broadly similar estimates.
3.3 Birth Timing Results
We find that the conditional probability of birth declined following sulfa-led reductions in pneu-
monia mortality (Panel A, Table 1). Notably, fertility declined on the intensive and extensive
18Although pre-intervention levels of pneumonia and maternal mortality are positively correlated, they also exhibit
substantial independent variation across the U.S. states (see Figure A.1 in Appendix C), and Appendix Figure A.2.
The parameter α2 will reflect causal effects of maternal mortality decline on the birth probability.
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margins (see columns (2) and (3)).19 We scale our estimates using an interquartile shift in (base-
line) pneumonia mortality (-0.26), which is close to the actual nationwide decline that took place
after 1937.
This implies a 0.6 percentage point reduction in the annual probability of birth, which relative
to the annual mean of 8.6% before 1937 is a reduction of 6.9% (column (1)). The estimates in
column (2) for the extensive margin response imply a 0.3 percentage point reduction in the annual
probability of transitioning to motherhood after 1937, which is 5.9% of the pre-intervention mean of
5.1%. For a woman exposed to sulfa drugs for ten years of her fertile period, this is a 3 percentage
point increase in the probability of being childless.
The intensive margin result shows that the same interquartile shift implies a 0.25 percentage
point reduction in the probability of transitioning to a higher order birth after 1937, which is 1.7%
of the pre-intervention mean of 14.9%.20 Thus, the decline in pneumonia mortality delayed the
transition to first and higher order births. The delay to the first birth was about three times the
delay to higher order births, which is consistent with the impact of sulfa exposure on childlessness
that we document in Section 5 below.
Event study for birth timing We estimate an event study specification for probability of birth
similar to column (1) of Table 1, where we interact baseline pneumonia mortality with indicators for
every year in the sample period (1930-1943, with 1937 as the base year). Marginal effects calculated
from the log odds coefficients in the logit regression are plotted in Figure 4. While this exercise is
challenged by statistical power and not all coefficients are statistically significant, the plot suggests
a discrete change in 1937, with a decline in birth probability for women who experienced larger
declines in pneumonia mortality. This plot also provides a test of the identifying assumption that
pre-trends in birth outcomes in states with high versus low pre-intervention disease burdens were
not different, insofar as the coefficients show no trend before 1937. Overall, our findings show that
women delayed childbearing in response to improvements in child survival and child health.
3.4 Robustness Checks
We now discuss results of robustness checks motivated in the empirical strategy section.
Omitted trends While we have a clean policy experiment in the introduction of the drug,
we need to be sure that baseline levels of pneumonia mortality are not capturing other baseline
conditions. The event study mitigates this concern. We neverthess use pre-sulfa data to directly
19Column (1) in Table 1 pools a woman’s births, and in so doing assumes independence across recurrent events.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level, which allows for non-independence within mothers as, by construction,
they do not move state. The extensive margin result in column (2) is robust to this concern, as the extensive margin
has one event (the first birth).
20Standardizing the logistic coefficients by the variance in the outcome variable yields coefficients that are directly
comparable across samples, and shows that the negative effect of the reduction in pneumonia mortality on the
extensive margin birth probability in column (2) is similar to the effect on the overall birth probability in column
(1), and both are approximately three times the size of the effect on the intensive margin in column (3).
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model trends. We regress the probability of birth in the pre-sulfa era, 1930-1936, on a linear time
trend interacted with a dummy variable equal to one for states with above median mortality, and
zero otherwise. The results, in Appendix Table A.27, show no evidence of differential pre-trends
across high and low mortality states in the hazard sample.
The most likely candidate confounders in our setting are economic development and the disease
epidemiology of the state. Our baseline specification controls for trends in 15 indicators of state-level
disease prevalence, income, infrastructure, women’s labour force participation, and an indicator
for changes in the quality of birth and death surveillance. Here we first assess sensitivity of the
coefficient of interest to dropping these controls. The coefficient remains statistically significant but
is smaller in absolute terms (column (1), Panel B, Table 1). We then enrich the baseline specification
by interacting all state-level control variables with a full set of year dummies (instead of with just
the indicator for post-1937). Although this adds 165 control variables to the specification, and
renders the coefficient of interest smaller, it remains statistically significant and negative (column
(2), Table 1). We next enrich the model by controlling for state occupational structure in 1930
interacted with post1937 (column (6), Table 2).21 The estimates are robust to this check.
We allow for the possibility that the underlying confounders are poorly measured (e.g. state
income may not fully capture economic development), following Pei, Pischke, and Schwandt (2018)
and perform a version of a balance test. We regress all of the state-level variables on the sulfa expo-
sure variable.22 Of the numerous tests, only one is statistically significant, which is the coefficient
on pneumonia exposure in the equation for tuberculosis mortality. Investigating this by estimating
an event study model for tuberculosis mortality decline, we see a secular decline with no break in
1937.
We residualise pneumonia mortality by all our state control variables, and show the spatial
dispersion of residualised pneumonia mortality across the United States in Figure 5. This illustrates
that residualised pneumonia mortality is well dispersed. To provide evidence that our results do not
capture differences in trends between regions of the U.S., we show estimates of the hazard model
where we omit the mountain west and deep south states in turn (Appendix Table A.19, columns
(3) and (4)).23 This does not substantially change the estimates.
Recognizing that however rich the set of observables is, there are potential unobservables, the
baseline specification in the hazard model includes census region-year fixed effects. The estimates
are similar in magnitude and not statistically different when we instead include state linear trends
or the more fine-grained census division-year fixed effects (columns (4) and (5), Panel B, Table 1).
21Occupational structure is calculated as the share of women employed in primary, secondary or tertiary industries
in the 1930 census, yielding three variables.
22Specifically, we estimate variants of the regression
controlvars,t = α+β1post1937∗prePnemonias+β2post1937∗preMMRs+β3prePneumonias+β4preMMRs+β5θt,
where controlvar are all the state-time varying controls in our main estimates. For compactness we do not report
these results but they are available on request from the authors.
23The mountain states are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. The
deep south states are Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.
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We assess mean reversion by controlling for the state-level pre-sulfa average value of the outcome
variableand find it does not change the coefficient of interest; see Column (5) in Table 2.
Coincident events Inference with our research strategy relies on getting the timing of the intro-
duction of antibiotics right. For this we rely on documentary evidence that the advent of sulfa drugs
was widely publicized, for example in a New York Times article in December 1936 (“Conquering
Streptococci”), and that historians have documented widespread uptake in 1937 (Lesch 2007). Ap-
pendix Figure A.3 shows extracts from two articles that appeared in the New York Times in 1936.
The first stage trend break plot for pneumonia and the event study for fertility both confirm that
the structural break in trend was in 1937.
Still, we may be concerned that these changes were driven by a coincident event rather than by
the arrival of sulfa drugs. The United States entered the Second World War in December 1941. To
assess the relevance of this, we restrict the sample to births occurring before 1942. Our findings are
essentially unchanged (column (1), Table 2). To capture potential impacts of the Great Depression
and subsequent recovery, we accessed data on state-year data on New Deal spending (Fishback,
Kantor, and Wallis 2003) and included this as a control, interacted with sulfa exposure (post1937
in the hazard model). The coefficients of interest are robust to this (column (2) in Table 2). The
Dust Bowl refers to a period of drought and dust storms during the 1930s that damaged agriculture
in several southern U.S. states and resulted in large out-migration from those states.24 The results
are, if anything, strengthened by the omission of the Dust Bowl states (column (3), Table 2).
Sulfa drugs were available without prescription until 1939. Our findings are similar when we
exclude all births after prescription was introduced (column (4), Table 2). We also verify that the
coefficients on pneumonia mortality decline are not significantly different when omitting maternal
mortality decline (columns (2) and (3) in Appendix Table A.32). Finally, the 1930s and 1940s did
experience some increases in childcare provision, particularly during WW2, in order to encourage
female employment. However, the Lanham Act was not implemented until 1943, and provided only
130,000 spaces for children (far short of the intended two million), and these child care centres were
quickly closed down after WW2.
Measurement issues If we replace the all-age baseline pneumonia mortality rate with the under-
5 rate then the coefficient is correctly signed, but small and imprecisely estimated, consistent with
known measurement error in this measure. Once we instrument this with the all-age rate to correct
for measurement error, it is statistically and substantively significant (column (3), Table 1).
So as to investigate the related concern that the pneumonia mortality measure is masking
impacts of decline in adult mortality from other diseases, we include additional variables measuring
adult mortality rates for the placebo diseases (in the baseline specification, these are included as
all-age rates with the exception of diarrhea, which was for under-2s given that adults typically do
not die of diarrhea). Column (7), Table 2 shows that the coefficient of interest is stable to this
24These were Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas.
17
check.
We now consider potential concerns with the way that we measure fertility. First, we measure
fertility using information on children living at home in census data. As a check on this, we only
include potential births from the 1950 census that would have occurred in the years 1940-43: this
way, the oldest child would have been ten (Appendix Table A.19, column (1)); the results are
similar). Second, the conception date is a more accurate measure of a woman’s fertility choice than
the birth date of the child. We proxy a child’s date of conception as one year before the date of
birth, and re-estimate the hazard model using the date of conception as the outcome rather than
the date of birth (Table A.19, column (2)) and again the estimates are similar.25
Endogenous migration If prospective mothers migrated in response to disease, then the in-
troduction of sulfa drugs may have influenced migration patterns. In the baseline sample, we omit
migrants, defined as women whose birth state is not the same as their state of residence at enumer-
ation. If we instead include these women, and instrument for mortality decline exposure in their
state of residence using mortality decline exposure in their birth state, the results are unchanged
(Appendix Table A.26, columns (1)-(2)). We modeled migration as a function of post-sulfa declines
in pneumonia and maternal mortality using two different indicators for migration. First, we de-
fined an indicator for migrants as individuals for whom the birth state is different from the census
enumeration state; second, we defined an indicator for migration between 1935 and 1940 using the
information from the 1940 census. The estimates in Appendix Table A.26 show no evidence that
sulfa-induced changes in mortality rates influenced migration.
Other checks Appendix C discusses a number of other specification checks. It shows that our
estimates are robust to using alternative age-at-census sample definitions, to adjustment of standard
errors for multiple hypothesis testing, exclusion of outlier states and to including woman fixed
effects.
4 Theoretical Model: Child Mortality, Fertility and Labor Market
Participation
The preceding section shows that women delayed fertility in response to child mortality decline. The
intensive margin result is consistent with the predictions of the classical quantity-quality model,
and recent innovations which predict that as health improves and mortality declines, women have
fewer children and invest more in each (Becker and Lewis 1973). Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder
25When child mortality is high, gross fertility (children ever born to a woman) will overestimate surviving births.
Measuring children living with the mother partially addresses this problem, but not entirely as children alive at the
census date may subsequently die. The extent of overestimation will be correlated with pre-intervention pneumonia
mortality, which is part of our exposure variable. Pneumonia mortality rates decline exponentially from birth to age
five, after which they flatten out. Therefore, the fact that we find similar estimates when restricting our measure of
fertility to children aged below 10 and when including all surviving children, suggests that any survivorship bias is
likely to play a limited role in our estimates.
18
(2014) argue that factors like child mortality decline should increase extensive margin fertility by
increasing the value of having at least one child. We, however, find a decrease in extensive margin
fertility. We hypothesise that this seeming contradiction can be resolved by taking a wider lens, and
considering that child health improvements may affect fertility timing and women’s labor market
participation. Essentially, when child mortality declines, women can afford to start fertility later to
achieve a given fertility target, in addition to which they may lower their target fertility. Fertility
delay enables labor market participation and can eventually result in childlessness.26
In this section we present a new model incorporating dynamic fertility and labor supply choices.
We present here the central economic insights from a simple model, and we discuss extensions to this
framework in Appendix D, where we also provide the formal proofs. The model yields predictions
not only for extensive margin fertility but also for later life outcomes, including childlessness and
labor market participation, which we investigate in Section 5.
4.1 Model Environment
There is a population of women indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] whose life cycle consists of three periods
t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Women have utility U = A · u (n, e) + c, where n ∈ Z is the (integer) number of their
surviving children at the end of the life cycle, e ∈ R+ is her choice of child quality, and c ∈ R+ is her
consumption. We assume that u (n, e) is strictly concave and twice differentiable, with u (0, e) = 0
for all e.
We allow for heterogeneity in the preference parameter A, which measures women’s preference
for children relative to other consumption. We assume that A has cumulative distribution F (A)
across women, with density f (A) = F ′ (A) > 0 for all A ≥ 0.
The timing of events is as follows: At both dates t = 1 and t = 2, a woman decides whether to
get pregnant. If she gets pregnant, denoted at = 1, she gives birth to a child, who survives with
probability 1 − λ, where λ is the rate of child mortality. If she does not get pregnant, denoted
at = 0, she can work for a wage yt. Her potential wage follows a simple stochastic process that
captures the “job then family” pattern of the sulfa drug era (Goldin 2004) and is initialized at
y1 = 0. If the does not get pregnant at t = 1, she is promoted with probability p, in which case her
potential wage rises to y2 = Y > 0. Otherwise, her wage remains at y2 = 0. We also analyze the
robustness of our results in the presence of richer income processes, which we discuss below.
At date 3, the woman’s fertility is complete, and she takes as given the final number of her
surviving children n ∈ {0, 1, 2}. She chooses her consumption c and child quality e so as to
26Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) also study a model in which women choose fertility over the life cycle, which
they use to quantify the career costs of fertility in an environment where child mortality and health is held constant.
Our model makes a complementary contribution by providing a clear analysis of the effects of health shocks.
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maximize utility subject to her budget constraint:
max
e,c
A · u (n, e) + c subject to
c+ n (τq + τee) ≤
2∑
t=1
(1− at) yt + ω. (2)
The left-hand side of the budget constraint (2) measures her spending on consumption and children.
As in the classical quantity-quality model (Becker and Lewis 1973, Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder
2014), her expenditure on children is n (τq + τee), where τq is the price of child quantity, and τe is
the price of quality per child. Her total wealth, on the right-hand side of the budget constraint, is
given by the sum of wages in all periods in which she worked, and an exogenous endowment ω. In
contrast to Becker and Lewis (1973) and Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014), where income
is exogenous, we endogenize it.
Substituting the budget constraint (2) into the woman’s objective, we find that the woman’s
choice of child quality e at date 3 must solve the simplified maximization problem
Vn (A) = max
e
{A · u (n, e)− n (τq + τee)} . (3)
The function Vn (A) denotes the woman’s surplus, i.e., the utility that the woman enjoys at date
t = 3 over and above consuming her wealth. Note that, for n = 0, surplus is V0 (A) = 0 for all A,
while the optimal e is indeterminate. For n > 0, suplus maximization is a well-behaved, concave
problem in e, and the surplus is increasing in the preference parameter A. With the dynamic
decision process we have specified, our model therefore circumvents the potential non-convexity of
the classical quantity-quality model, in which n and e are chosen simultaneously.
In this section, we present a simple case that isolates the effects of child mortality on fertility
on the extensive margin. We assume that a woman’s surplus is maximized when having at most
one child, that is,
V1 (A) < V2 (A) , for all A ≥ 0. (4)
For example, if the women’s preferences have the Cobb-Douglas form u (n, e) = eαn1−α, then (4)
holds if and only if α > 12 . In the Appendix, we extend our results in an environment without this
assumption.
4.2 Optimal Fertility and Labor Supply choices
We begin by characterizing a woman’s optimal fertility and labor supply choices as a function of
the preference parameter A, which measures the strength of her preference for having children. We
show that the optimal fertility choice is fully characterized by three scenarios, which we refer to as
no fertility, delayed fertility and early fertility:
Proposition 1 The woman’s optimal fertility choice is as follows:
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1. No Fertility: If A < A, where A is defined by V1 (A) = 0, the woman works at t = 1 and at
t = 2 with probability 1.





then the woman works at t = 1 and gets pregnant at t = 2 if and only if she is not promoted.
3. Early Fertility: If Ā (λ) ≤ A, then the woman gets pregnant at t = 1, and gets pregnant
again at t = 2 if and only if she does not have a surviving child yet.
The first point in the proposition is clear: if the woman’s preference A for children is so weak
that the surplus V1 (A) from having a child is negative, then it is never optimal to get pregnant.
The second and third points explain the optimal timing of fertility. The proposition establishes
that it is optimal for the woman to delay her fertility until t = 2 whenever her preference A is
strong enough to satisfy the following inequality:
(p+ λ) (1− λ)V1 (A) ≥ pY (5)
This expression has an intuitive interpretation. The right-hand side of (5) is the marginal benefit
of delay in terms of income. By delaying, the woman has a probability p of being promoted, which
leads to additional earnings Y . The left-hand side is the marginal cost of delay. To interpret this
term, consider the following two effects. On the one hand, a woman who delays will (optimally)
remain childless if she is promoted. If not promoted, she would have had a child with probability
1 − λ. Hence, the possibility of promotion reduces the probability of having a child by p (1− λ).
On the other hand, a woman who delays has one fewer attempt at fertility, which reduces the
probability of having a surviving child by λ (1− λ). Combining these two effects, delaying reduces
the probability of having a child by a total of (p+ λ) (1− λ). Scaling this probability by the surplus
V1(A) associated with having a child yields our expression for the marginal cost. The formal proof
of Proposition 1 also verifies the conjecture that it is never optimal for a woman to get pregnant
after being promoted. Intuitively, this behavior would be optimal only for women with strong
preferences for children, for whom early fertility is a dominant strategy to begin with.27
We can gain additional intuition by re-writing Equation (5) as
V1(A)λ(1− λ) ≥ p [Y − V1(A)(1− λ)] (6)
The right-hand side can be interpreted as the option value of delay, which measures the expected
utility gain from getting promoted, which arises with probability p. The left-hand side is the
insurance value of early pregnancy. The insurance value of early pregnancy measures the expected
utility gain from having a second chance: with probability λ, the first pregnancy does not survive,
but the second survives with probability 1 − λ. The second chance thus adds value V1(A) with
27Different patterns of behavior are possible in models with a richer income process or dynamics beyond three
periods. We show in the Appendix that these extensions have more complex solutions, but do not alter our main
qualitative results.
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probability λ(1 − λ). It is optimal to get pregnant early when the insurance value exceeds the
option value of delay.
Next, we derive the overall probability of childlessness in the population of women. This prob-
ability is a key object of our empirical analysis in the next section, where we study the impact of
sulfa drugs on childlessness.
Proposition 2 The probability that a woman in the population is childless at date 3 is

















This proposition evaluates the probability of childlessness in each of the three cases that govern
the optimal choice, weighted by the mass of women that fall into each case. The top line in Equation
(7) is simply the fraction of women with no fertility. The middle line is the fraction of women with
delayed fertility times their probability of childlessness. This probability is the sum of p, since
they are childless if promoted, and (1− p)λ, since they are childless if they are not promoted but
suffer an unsuccessful pregnancy. Finally, the bottom line is based on the fraction of women who
choose early fertility. Since these women have two attempts at having a child, their probability of
childlessness is lower and equal to λ2.
4.3 The Effect of Shocks to Child Mortality
We now characterize the effects of a change in the rate λ of child mortality on women’s incentives.
Proposition 3 The optimal choice, as characterized in Proposition 1, responds to changes in the
child mortality rate λ as follows:
1. The threshold A, at which a woman switches from no fertility to delayed fertility, is indepen-
dent of λ.
2. The threshold Ā (λ), at which a woman switches from delayed to early fertility, satisfies ∂Ā∂λ < 0





The first point in this Proposition is that the boundary between no fertility and early fertility
does not change in response to a change in λ. This is because no fertility is chosen only by women
who perceive negative surplus from having a child. The boundary is therefore at the point where
surplus (as defined in (15)) is zero, which is independent of λ.
The second point shows that incentives to delay are decreasing in λ, as long as λ is not too
large. This is because an increase in λ raises the marginal cost of childlessness by reducing the
22
likelihood of success for a woman who has only one attempt at having a child.28
Figure 6 provides a numerical illustration of these effects. The figure considers a range of
values for λ along the horizontal axis and a range of preference parameters A on the vertical axis.
Motivated by the empirical setting, we focus on values for the child mortality rate λ ≤ 15%. We
plot the regions in which women choose no fertility, delayed fertility and early fertility. Consistent
with Proposition 3, Panel (a) shows that the region of delay widens when λ declines, as women
switch their behavior away from early fertility. For the same preference parameter, a woman is
more likely to delay her fertility as child mortality declines. Panel (b) shows that the pattern also
holds, and indeed becomes more pronounced, if the woman is fertile for a greater number of time
periods (see our discussion of the general dynamic model below and in Appendix D.3).
The interesting and hitherto little recognized implication is that a decline in child mortality can
lead to increased incentives to delay fertility. Several extensions to our model, which we discuss
in detail below, show that this finding is robust to enriching the specification. For example, we
show that it goes through in environments that feature a richer income process, general dynamic
decisions, increasing risks of infertility with age, as well as optimal marriage and career choices.
Before discussing the detailed empirical implications of this result, we characterize its implica-
tions for the rate of childlessness in the population as a whole.
Proposition 4 The probability of childlessness, as characterized in Proposition 2, responds to a
change in the child mortality rate λ as follows:























(p+ λ) (1− λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
behavioral effect: switch early → delay
(9)
This result decomposes the effect of a change in λ on the probability of childlessness into two
terms. The first line in Equation (9) is the mechanical effect of a change in λ, holding women’s
behavior constant. This effect is always positive. Any increase in λ mechanically leads to fewer
surviving children and, hence, a higher incidence of childlessness. This force affects women who
choose either delayed or early fertility. The second line is the behavioral effect that arises from
changes in women’s optimal choices. Women with A = Ā (λ), who are indifferent between early
and delayed fertility, switch their optimal strategy in response to a marginal change in λ.29 This





Concretely, consider the case where λ is small in the sense of Condition (8). Suppose that there
is a beneficial health shock that decreases λ. The mechanical effect is a decrease in childlessness.
28By contrast, the marginal cost (p+ λ) (1− λ)V1 (A) of delay is decreasing in λ for large values of λ. Intuitively,
as λ → 1, both pregnancies of a woman who chooses early fertility are likely to fail, so that the “insurance” value of
starting early declines to zero.
29For a discrete change in λ, this implies that there is an interval of women who will switch their behavior between
delayed and early fertility.
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The behavioral effect, however, is that some women switch from early to delayed fertility, which
reduces their overall probability of having children. If the density of switchers is large enough, then
the behavioral effect dominates and the overall effect on childlessness is positive.
In a model with a more general income process, there is an offsetting effect whereby a decline
in λ can encourage women to switch from no fertility into delayed fertility.30 However, when the
density of switchers from early to delayed fertility is sufficiently large, this additional effect is
dominated by the effects of increased delay.
4.4 Empirical Predictions
In our empirical analysis, we are interested in the causal effects of a beneficial shock, namely, the
introduction of sulfa drugs, which led to declines in both child mortality and child morbidity. As
a benchmark, recall the predictions of the classical quantity-quality model of fertility (Becker and
Lewis 1973). In this model, women only solve a static surplus maximization problem similar to
(15). Beneficial health shocks in this framework are typically modeled as declines in the prices
(τn, τq) of child quantity and quality. The empirical implication of the quantity-quality model is
that beneficial health shocks always decrease the likelihood of childlessness, because they increase
the surplus associated with having at least one child (Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder 2014).
In contrast to the basic quantity-quality model, our model predicts that a beneficial health shock
increases the likelihood of childlessness, as long as it enocourages enough women to delay their
fertility. As we have discussed above, a necessary condition for this prediction is that the baseline
rate λ of child mortality is not too large, that is, that Condition (8) holds. In our empirical setting,
a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this condition is plausible. A population average
child mortality rate of 47 per 1000 live births in 1939 (Dowell, Kupronis, Zell, and Shay 2000)
implies that λ = 471000 , so that Condition (8) is satisfied if the probability of promotion is less than
90.6%.31
The effects of health shocks through prices, which are the focus of the quantity-quality literature,
can also be incorporated in our dynamic model. If a health shock decreases the rate of child
mortality but also decreases prices, then the effects of lower prices and of decreased mortality push
women’s optimal fertility timing decisions in opposite directions. In this case, one needs to impose
a tighter upper bound than (8) on λ to ensure that a beneficial health shock encourages delayed
fertility (see Appendix D.2).
In our baseline model, we have focused on extensive margin fertility decisions. In Appendix
D we further consider higher birth orders. This leads to an additional prediction, namely, that a
beneficial health shock leads to lower numbers of children on the intensive margin, again as long as
it leads a sufficient measure of women to delay their fertility.32
30For example, consider a model where the pre-promotion wage, which we set to zero for simplicity, is y > 0. No
fertility in this model is optimal whenever A ≤ A (λ), which is implicitly defined by y = (1− λ)V1 (A (λ)). Moreover,
A (λ) is increasing in λ.
31Women in this era primarily worked in teaching and typing jobs, where the probability of promotion was low
(Goldin 2004).
32Unlike the predictions of our model on the extensive margin, this prediction is also a feature of the standard
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The key mechanism in our model is that women have stronger incentives to enter the labor
market, and have children later, after a positive health shock. When they do, they benefit from the
possibility of being promoted and, if promoted, they remain in the labor market instead of having
children. Thus, the model delivers several auxiliary predictions that allow us to test the mechanism
behind changes in fertility. Concretely, our model predicts that a beneficial health shock :
1. Leads to later fertility, even among women that eventually have children, also increasing
marriage delay and the risk of never marrying (see Appendix D.4.4),
2. Increases female labor force participation, and
3. Increases the number of women in more prestigious, highly paid employment.
In the next section we take these predictions to the data.
4.5 Extensions and Robustness
The main novelty in our model is the result, stated in Proposition 3, that declines in child mortality
can lead to increased incentives to delay fertility. This is true for parameter values delineated by
Condition (8), which is likely to be satisfied in our empirical context. We now discuss a series of
extensions to the model. These extensions are analyzed formally in Appendix D. In each case, we
analyze the equivalents of Proposition 3 and Condition (8) and discuss how they deviate from the
baseline model.
1. General dynamics (Appendix D.3). We extend the baseline model to T periods. We derive
a closed form solution to the Bellman equation associated with optimal fertility timing. We
show that, if Condition (8) holds, a decline in child mortality λ strengthens incentives to
delay fertility across the board. For example, the optimal date of the first pregnancy switches
from t = 1 to t = 2 for a range of preference parameters A, from t = 2 to t = 3 for another
range, and so forth. Thus, the qualitative effects in a general dynamic model are the same as
in the simple three-period model we have presented above.
2. Income effects (Appendix D.4.1). We consider more general preferences and a richer income
process to study the potential implications of income effects. Income effects become relevant
when child quality (e.g., education) accounts for a large fraction of households’ expenditure.
In this setting, a woman who has worked for one period spends more on child quality and
enjoys greater surplus from having a child. Therefore, changes in λ have a stronger effect on
the value of delay than on the value of early fertility, which reinforces the mechanism by which
health shocks encourage delay. Accordingly, with some natural restrictions on preferences,
we show that income effects strengthen our argument in the sense that we now obtain our
key results under a weaker condition than (8).
quantity-quality model, in which women tend to substitute out of quantity and into quality after a beneficial health
shock.
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3. Higher birth orders (Appendix D.4.2). We relax Assumption (4) so as to incorporate women
who wish to have more than one child. Intuitively, the prospect of having several children
weakens women’s incentives to delay their fertility. We therefore derive a stronger condition
(8), which guarantee that declines in child mortality encourage fertility delay.
4. Increasing risk of infertility (Appendix D.4.3). We consider a model in which the woman risks
becoming infertile each period, so that the overall risk of infertility is increasing over time.
We show that a slightly stronger condition than Condition (8) is needed to recover our main
results in this case. Intuitively, declining fecundity makes delayed fertility less attractive, and
also reduces the incentive to switch to delayed fertility after a health shock. Figure A.6 shows
that the pattern of increased delay in the numerical example also holds when we allow for
increasing risk of infertility.
5. Marriage decisions (Appendix D.4.4). For the sample of women in our empirical analysis,
the social norm was to leave the labor force and get married before having children. We
explore the implications of our model for marriage decisions by assuming that a woman’s first
pregnancy is contingent on finding a partner and getting married. We further assume that
finding a partner is probabilistic. This feature makes delayed fertility a more risky prospect
than early fertility. The economic effects of this force are similar to the case with an increasing
risk of infertility, which we have discussed above.
6. Career choices (Appendix D.4.5). We analyze the behavior of women who can choose between
a risky career with large income upon promotion, such as we have modeled above, and a safe
career with a flatter income trajectory. We show that women who plan to delay fertility
self-select into risky careers. We also demonstrate that the presence of career choices does
not alter the qualitative effects of changes in child mortality.
5 Impacts on Later Life Outcomes: Fertility, Labor Market and
Marriage
In this Section, we bring the data to bear on the theoretical predictions of the model in Section 4.
Having already established that sulfa exposure caused women to delay fertility at both the intensive
and extensive margins, we test whether it also led to more childlessness, lower completed fertility,
higher labor market participation, better careers, and less marriage. We find evidence in support
of these predictions.
5.1 Data
As before, we analyse the sample of women who were of reproductive age in a window around
the time of the introduction of sulfa drugs. Earlier we studied their birth outcomes during 1930
to 1943. We now track the same cohorts of women into their later life, identifying them in later
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census years using the 1% microdata samples of the 1940 to 1970 censuses. To model completed
fertility, we analyse women who were age 40-50 at the time of census enumeration.33
We also show results for women of childbearing age (18-40) at census enumeration, to corrobo-
rate any impacts on delay that we estimate in the hazard model. The sample includes birth cohorts
1893-1931 who were aged 6-44 in 1937. We exclude women aged five and under in 1937 as they
were potentially directly treated by antibiotics as children. We include not only women aged 15-40
in the period 1930-1943 (as in the birth timing sample) but also women who would have been
exposed to the sulfa drug era throughout their reproductive years (aged 6-15 in 1937) and women
who would not have been exposed at all (aged 40-44 in 1937).34 As in the birth timing sample,
we focus on net fertility (children resident in the household), but in a robustness check we also use
data on gross fertility (total number of live births) to show that both measures yield comparable
estimates. Data on labor market and marriage outcomes are from the same census files, and we
model outcomes for women aged 18 to 50 at the time of the census.
Table A.2 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics. Using net fertility (based on surviving
children) among women of childbearing age at the time of the census, the average woman was
exposed to sulfa drugs for 20 years, and 36% of women were childless, with 1.7 births in total, and
2.6 conditional on at least one. Among women who had completed their fertility at the time of the
census, the average woman was exposed to sulfa for 14.6 years, 28% of women were childless at the
end of their reproductive years, average total fertility was 1.9 (unconditional on at least one birth)
and 2.7 conditional on at least one. The mean age at first birth in the stock sample was 24.1, and
26.7 at second birth. In the labor maket sample, 37% of women were in the labor force, and 35%
were working, with average working hours of 13 per week.35 73% of women reported being currently
married, and 85% had been married at least once previous to the date of census enumeration.
5.2 Empirical Strategy
As we consider cumulative fertility and marital and labor market outcomes later in life, the relevant
measure of exposure is the number of fertile years that occur in the post-1937 period. We again
leverage variation in pre-1937 pneumonia as a proxy for treatment intensity in a double difference
specification, interacting sulfa exposure years with pre-sulfa mortality rates at the birth state level.
The estimating equation for outcomes measured later in life is:
33The oldest woman in this was 44 in 1937, and she was reproductive until 1933, and the youngest woman was six
in 1937, so that she was reproductive from 1946 onwards.For example, the 1917 cohort will have turned 40 in 1957,
so we find them in the 1960 census when looking at their completed fertility.
34We have intentionally opted to select samples based on age at census enumeration, in order to compare outcomes
during childbearing and after childbearing years. This means that there is a small difference between the cohorts
analyzed across the childbearing and completed fertility samples. We have verified that our main results are very
similar when we restrict the sample of each estimate to have exactly the same cohorts.
35This includes women reporting zero hours of work; focusing only on positive working hours, the average was 37.9.
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Yjsc = β + β1 ∗ prePneumonias ∗ sulfayearsj (10)
+β2 ∗ preMMRs ∗ sulfayearsj + statecontrolss ∗ sulfayearsj
+racej + educj + κs + ϕc + ωjsc,
where Yjsc is the outcome of woman j born in state s in cohort c recorded at the time of the
census. The coefficient of interest is β1. The variable sulfayearsj is the number of fertile years of
woman j during which she was exposed to sulfa drugs. We assume women are fertile between the
ages of 15 and 40.36 Similar to the main model for birth timing, this model includes fixed effects for
the woman’s birth cohort and birth state, her race and education, and the same set of state-time
varying controls detailed in Section 3.2 interacted with sulfayearsj . Standard errors are clustered
at the birth state level.
Since we model cumulative exposure and not an event, this specification is not suitable for an
event study, but we provide a descriptive analogue, depicting a dose-response relationship between
fertility and years exposed to sulfa drugs. As sulfayearsj is defined on year of birth, we also show
results replacing this linearly evolving exposure measure with a binary measure that compares
women who were fully exposed with women who were unexposed, removing women who were
partially exposed.37
To identify the extensive margin response (childlessness), we redefine the dependent variable as
a binary indicator for non-zero versus zero children. To identify the intensive margin response, we
re-estimate equation (10) for total number of children but restricting the sample to women with at
least one birth. We estimate impacts on the following labor market outcomes: whether in the labor
force; whether working; the hours worked in the past week; the Hauser-Warren occupational score
(see Appendix A for a precise definition), and own income in the last year. We estimate impacts
on the following marriage market outcomes: whether currently married, ever married and the age
at first marriage conditional on ever having married.
5.3 Results: Impacts on Childlessness and Total Fertility
We have identified that women delayed the transition to first birth and to higher order births in
response to the introduction of sulfa drugs. To assess whether the response was only an intertem-
poral substitution, we estimate impacts of the intervention on total fertility of the same cohorts of
women tracked through to a later stage of their lifecycle. We first discuss estimates for women who
36Notice that when we use the sample of women of reproductive age at the time of the census in these later census
files, sulfayearsj may include future years: for example, a woman aged 33 at the time of the 1950 census who was
20 in 1937, would have 20 fertile sulfa years in total, of which 7 are in the future. If women make dynamic fertility
choices, they care about their total exposure to sulfa drugs, and not only their past exposure.
37A number of recent studies suggest that including unit-specific trends can either exacerbate biases inappropriately
or washout treatment effects when the evolution of these effects increases over time (or as in our case, with increasing
cohort exposure); see, for example, Young and Gary (2011); Bhuller, Havnes, Leuven, and Mogstad (2013); Goodman-
Bacon (2021).
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were still childbearing at the time of the later census. These estimates will capture a combination
of fertility delay and changes in fertility targets, which is useful to corroborate the birth timing
estimates. We then report results for women who have completed childbearing.
An increase in childlessness will mechanically decrease intensive margin fertility. For instance,
if women who would otherwise have had one child switch to having none, then the increase in
childlessness will be mirrored in a decrease in the share of women with one child. We therefore also
estimate the impact of pneumonia mortality decline on the distribution of fertility.
Number of children among women of childbearing age Using data on women aged 18-40
at census interview and modelling the number of children they have had at the time of interview
confirms the birth timing results. There is a significant decline in fertility at both the intensive and
extensive margins (Panel A, Table 3).38 The specification in column (1) implies that an interquartile
decline in pneumonia mortality (0.26) was associated with 0.013 fewer births for an additional year
of exposure to sulfa drugs. Relative to the mean of 1.66 children in the estimating sample, a woman
with the average years of exposure in this sample (20) had 0.25 fewer births, or 15% of baseline.
Conditional upon having at least one birth, women had 0.18 fewer births for mean levels of
exposure (which is 7% of the conditional mean of 2.6 births). A similar calculation implies a 0.23
percentage point increase in the probability of childlessness for an additional year of sulfa exposure,
and a 4.6 percentage point increase in the probability of childlessness for the mean duration of
exposure (13% of the baseline rate of childlessness, which is 36% in this still-childbearing sample).
To estimate impacts on the distribution, we define indicator variables for the number of children
a woman has at census being 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4+ and estimate equation (10) separately for each of
these outcomes, see Figure 7. We see a leftward shift of the fertility distribution in response to
reductions in pneumonia mortality, with statistically significant responses at the two ends of the
distribution: in response to pneumonia (child) mortality decline, women were more likely to be
childless and less likely to have three or more children. Notably, although the coefficients are
negative, there was no significant change in the share of women with either one or two children.
Completed fertility We now discuss fertility impacts on women who were age 40-50 at census
and had thus plausibly completed their fertility. We present results using the same net fertility
measure as used in the hazard model, which relies on counts of children living at home, for which
we impose an upper limit of age at census of 50 to reduce the omission of children who have left
home.39
The pattern of results is similar to that documented so far: pneumonia mortality decline is
associated with a significant decline in fertility on both the extensive and intensive margins. In
38For some of these women, a disproportionate share of whom are younger and hence sulfa-treated during their
reproductive years, fertility is right-truncated. This will be captured by fixed effects for the woman’s age, which we
consistently include.
39We will underestimate fertility counts because some of the older children will have left home. Since older women
in the sample will have had fewer years of sulfa exposure, if we selectively under-estimate their fertility, we will tend
to under-estimate the coefficient of interest. The estimates we show are, by this criterion, conservative.
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particular, an interquartile decline in pneumonia mortality (0.26), evaluated at the average number
of reproductive years of exposure to sulfa drugs (14.9), led to 0.11 fewer children for the average
woman, which is 5.7% of the pre-sulfa baseline mean, and a 1.4 percentage point increase in the
probability of being childless, a 5.0% increase from baseline (Panel B, Table 3).
Comparing estimates for net fertility among women age 40-50 at enumeration with the estimates
for fertility of women of childbearing age (18-40) from the preceding section (comparing Panels A
and B in Table 3), the coefficients for women who have completed fertility are consistently smaller
than the coefficients for women who are of childbearing age. This is also evident when comparing
changes in the distribution of incomplete and completed fertility (Figure 7). The estimates suggest
that two thirds of the estimated impact of pneumonia mortality on childlessness in the childbearing-
age sample is compensated delay, and that one third is a rise in permanent childlessness; the latter
will likely incorporate both a decline in target fertility and uncompensated fertility delay that may
arise from biological decline in fecundity or from failure to find a marital match, as modelled in
Section 4.
5.4 Results: Labor Market and Education Outcomes
Panel A of Table 5 shows that reductions in pneumonia mortality led to improved labor market
outcomes for women by every indicator used, other than income.40 A decline in pneumonia mortal-
ity corresponding to an interquartile shift in the distribution, for a woman with the mean exposure
to sulfa drugs in the estimating sample (18.3 years), is estimated to have increased the probability
of being in the labor force by 2.6 percentage points and the probability of being employed of 2.8
percentage points. The average labor force participation rate (employment rate) in this sample
is 37.1% (35.1%), so this increase is 7.0% (8.0%) of the baseline rate. This is of broadly similar
magnitude to our estimate of the increase in the share of childless women.41
The same decline in pneumonia mortality led to an increase in the occupation-based socioeco-
nomic index of 6.6% relative to the baseline index score of 14.4, suggesting that women exposed
to sulfa drugs had better careers, consistent with the mechanism in Section 4. We obtain similar
results when considering other occupational scores, including occscore and the Duncan socioeco-
nomic index. Pneumonia mortality decline increased weekly working hours by 1.15 hours, or 9%
of the baseline mean, which implies an annual increase of 13.8 hours for the sample average of 12
working weeks per year.42 Although the coefficient on pneumonia mortality decline is positive for
personal income, it is imprecisely estimated.
40As the census asks women about their current labor market status, we include all women aged 18-50 at the time
of the census, pooling both childbearing women and women aged 40-50, for whom we estimated effects on completed
fertility. The results are very similar when widening the sample to include women aged up to 60, and narrowing the
sample to women aged under 40; see Appendix C.
41If every additional childless woman worked (4.6pp from the net fertility measure), the increase in labor force
participation would be 12.4% of baseline labor force participation. Thus, 7% underlines the plausibility of the link
between changes in childlessness and employment of women.
42To put this in perspective, Bailey (2006) estimates an annual increase of 68 hours among cohorts with access to
the birth control pill.
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The joint probability of childlessness and labor force participation Thus far we have
demonstrated, using independent reduced form equations, that the sulfa-led reduction in pneumonia
mortality led to lower total fertility, higher childlessness and higher rates of labor force participation,
employment, working hours and occupational quality among women. Tabulating labor market
outcomes by childlessness status (Table A.3 in the Appendix) shows that childless women were 34
percentage points more likely to be in the labor force, worked 12 additional hours per week, earned
over $1000 more per year and had higher occupational scores than women who were mothers. In
order to provide robust evidence that these choices are linked and, in particular, that the same
women that respond with higher childlessness respond with higher labor force participation, we
estimate the impact of sulfa-led mortality declines on the joint probability of being childless and
being in the labor force (Table 6).
Reductions in pneumonia mortality increased the probability that women were both working
and childless by 2.7 percentage points (13% of the baseline probability of 20.5%); see column (1).
The probability of not being in the labor force and having children declined by 3.2 percentage
points, or 6.5% (column (4)), while the probability of not working and being childless, or working
and having children, did not change. We cannot reject that the coefficients in columns (1) and
(4) are of the same magnitude but opposite sign, which indicates that among women experiencing
greater declines in pneumonia mortality, stay-at-home mothers became less common, while working
women without children became more common.
Education outcomes To complement the results on labor market outcomes, in Appendix Table
A.15, we report estimates of the effect of sulfa-induced mortality decline on education choices.
Note that the fact that we consider women who were already of childbearing age in 1937 in our
main analysis means that many of these women will have already completed their education (these
were 74% in the birth timing sample and 68% in the completed fertility sample). We nevertheless
investigated education acquisition by creating a sample of women aged 15 to 25 in 1937 and defining
exposure to sulfa drugs as being aged 20 or under in 1937, as college completion typically occurred
in the early 20s. We estimate a 5.4 percentage point increase in the probability of high school
completion, relative to a baseline mean of 19.2% for this subsample of women. We find no effect on
the rate of college completion, which is consistent with Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006), who
discuss the timing of the expansion of college education, and that this occurred later, among the
children (rather than the mothers) of the sulfa cohorts.
5.5 Results: Marriage Market Outcomes
Fertility delay and investment in the labor market is likely to have repercussions for the marriage
market, and this mechanism is also discussed in an extension to the model in Section 4. We explore
the impact of sulfa exposure on current marital status and age at first marriage for childbearing
women (aged 18 to 40 at census) to capture any delay in marriage that may have mirrored fertility
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delay, and ever married status for women aged 18 to 50 at census.43 The results are in Panel B of
Table 5: reductions in pneumonia mortality led to both postponement of marriage and a decline in
marriage entry. A reduction in pneumonia mortality of the size of an interquartile shift is estimated
to have reduced the probability of women ever having married by 1.4 percentage points (1.65% of
baseline mean), and, among still childbearing women, to have reduced the probability of being
married at the time of the census by 1 percentage point (1.5%).
Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2019) propose a model of childlessness in which marriage is
a key pathway.44 In line with their predictions, we find that child mortality decline is associated
with lower chances of having ever married, alongside an increase in childlessness. However, the
coefficients indicate small effects relative to the labor market responses, suggesting that marriage
was one important margin of response, but that labor force participation, rather than marriage,
was the main mediator of impacts of child mortality decline on childlessness in our setting.
5.6 Robustness checks
This section discussed specification checks on the later life outcomes. Many of the checks presented
here are motivated and described in Section 3, so we discuss them briefly and point to the results.
We conduct all robustness checks on the net and gross fertility measures, to provide firm evidence
that our results are not driven by our choice of fertility measure.
Nonparametric patterns To corroborate our results, we show that similar patterns emerge in
a nonparametric specification that compares average outcomes over time in states that had above
versus below median pneumonia mortality in the pre-sulfa era. Figure A.5 in the Appendix shows
that in the 1950, 1960 and 1970 censuses, women in above-median mortality states who experienced
larger declines in child mortality exhibited increases in childlessness alongside lower intensive margin
fertility, relative to women in below-median states. In the pre-sulfa years (1930 census and before),
the trends in fertility outcomes look similar across these two groups of states. Similarly, while labor
force participation rates converge until 1940, they diverge after that, with women in above-median
mortality states participating in the labor force in greater numbers. Finally, marriage rates evolve in
a parallel fashion up until 1940, after which the marriage rates of women in above-median mortality
states fall and remain lower than those of women in below-median mortality states. These patterns
are consistent with the causal estimates.
Omitted trends The birth timing results are identified on the assumption that the event of the
introduction of sulfa drugs disrupts women’s birth profiles. In contrast to most studies of fertility,
we provide estimates both for birth probabilities around the event and for the eventual number
43Estimates using alternative age-at-census samples are in Appendix C.
44An important assumption in their model is that women have imperfect control over fertility. Child mortality
acts to limit the fertility of women of low socioeconomic status. Thus, they argue, a reduction in child mortality
will make less educated women less attractive on the marriage market, leading to increased childlessness and lower
fertility. We thank David de la Croix for this insight.
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of children. By their nature, models of end-line fertility rest on stronger identifying assumptions
than models of fertility behaviour on either side of an event. Nevertheless, the results stand up to
a number of checks. There is no natural event study but we provide a visual depiction of changes
in the outcome against variation in exposure. As exposure is a function of birth cohort, we interact
birth cohort “bins” with baseline pneumonia mortality, and plot the coefficients on the interaction
terms in Appendix Figure A.4. The omitted case is zero years of exposure. Panels A and B confirm
the main results that childlessness was more likely with higher years of exposure, and that the total
number of children was smaller. Panel C confirms hat women with higher years of exposure were
more likely to be in work.
Panel B in Appendix Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 adds controls for a full set of cohort * census
region fixed effects, and the coefficients are stable even in this more demanding specification. We
display sensitivity of the coefficients to varying the controls included in Table A.8. We augment
the rich set of state-level controls for disease environment, economic conditions and surveillance
quality with occupation structure. We include the state level occupational distribution of women
in 1930 interacted with sulfayears (Panel A, Appendix Tables A.16, A.17 and A.18). Finally, we
include as a control adult mortality rates for placebo diseases interacted with sulfayears (Panel
B, Appendix Tables A.16, A.17 and A.18).
We address the possible role of mean reversion by controlling for the state-level pre-sulfa average
value of the outcome variable (Panel D, Tables A.9-A.11). We estimate impacts of a ”placebo”
intervention using an approach similar to that in Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014). This
directly addresses concerns over omitted long-run trends in the stock model. We use data on
individual outcomes in the 1910-1930 censuses, selected so that the outcomes were realized before
the invention of sulfa drugs, and we create a placebo intervention forty years previous to the true
year (i.e. in 1897 rather than 1937), so that we have sufficient variation in placebo sulfa exposure
in the census data. We then estimate the baseline specification of the stock model. The results
in Panel A of Appendix Tables A.20-A.22 show that the coefficients on pneumonia mortality are
small and insignificant.
Since individual years of exposure evolve linearly as a function of birth cohort, we redefine the
exposure variables to be binary, comparing the fully exposed with the unexposed, and omitting
partially exposed women from the sample. The results are consistent with the main findings
(Appendix Table A.28).
To provide evidence that our results do not capture differences in trends between regions of the
U.S., we show estimates omitting the mountain west and deep south states in turn (Appendix Tables
A.20-A.22, Panels B and C). We also check that the coefficients on pneumonia mortality decline
are not sensitive to omitting maternal mortality decline (Panel B in Appendix Tables A.33-A.35).
Coincident events As with the birth timing model, we account for events occurring around
the time of sulfa drug intervention: WW2, the Great Depression and New Deal program and the
Dust Bowl. To account for the Second World War, in the stock model, we control for state-level
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troop deployment, obtained from Goldin and Olivetti (2013), interacted with individual exposure
to the war, measured as the number of fertile years of the woman from 1942 onwards. Our findings
are essentially unchanged (Panel B, Tables A.9-A.11). We interact New Deal spending (Fishback,
Kantor, and Wallis 2003) with sulfa exposure (sulfayears in the stock model). The coefficients
of interest are robust to this (Panel A, Appendix Table A.9 for fertility outcomes, and Panel A,
Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11, for labor and marriage market outcomes). Finally, we estimate a
specification where the Dust Bowl states are omitted (Panel C, Tables A.9-A.11).
Measurement issues To address the concern that the net fertility measure misses children who
have left home, we show similar estimates in three variants. First, we estimate results using gross
fertility, defined by a census question on total live births. These estimates, in Table 4, show 0.081
fewer total births for the average woman, which is 3% of the baseline mean, and a 0.8 percentage
point increase in the probability of being childless, which is 4.3% of the baseline mean. The
estimates are very similar to those for net fertility.
Second, we follow Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014) and in our measures of net fertility
only include children aged below 10 (Panel B of Appendix Table A.20). A further threat to inference
with net fertility arises if the age at which children leave home is correlated with state level baseline
pneumonia or maternal mortality. Although this should be absorbed by state fixed effects, the
results are similar when considering net fertility among different age groups of women at census,
focusing on younger women where children are less likely to have moved out; see Appendix C. We
also show estimates that use under-5 pneumonia mortality in place of the all-age rate, instrumented
with the all-age rate. The broad pattern of results holds, see Appendix Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7.
Our argument is that the decline in child mortality releases women’s time away from childbear-
ing and caring, allowing them to avail of labor market opportunities. We considered the alternative
explanation that labor market outcomes of women improved because the women themselves be-
came healthier. This is undermined by the low rates of morbidity and mortality from pneumonia
among prime-age adults. Nevertheless, to investigate this, we re-estimated the model including
baseline pneumonia mortality rates of 25-35 year-old adults alongside rates for children under five.
This is shown for labor market outcomes in Appendix Table A.13, and for completeness similar
specifications for fertility and marriage outcomes in Tables A.12 and A.14. The coefficients on the
adult rate are mostly insignificant and of the opposite sign, while the coefficients on the child rate
are consistent with the main estimates.
In the stock model, we also check that our conclusions are unchanged by including migrating
women and instrumenting their mortality decline exposure in their residence state with their birth
state (Appendix Tables A.23-A.25).
Other checks Appendix C discusses and shows that our estimates are robust to the following
further checks: alternative age-at-census sample definitions; adjustment of standard errors for
multiple hypothesis testing; including woman fixed effects; and exclusion of outlier states.
34
6 Broader Relevance: Long-Run Patterns in the Data
We have shown that in response to declines in pneumonia mortality, women had fewer children and
were more likely to be childless. They also had higher labor force participation and lower marriage
rates. To complement these findings from the context of sulfa drugs, we demonstrate that these
patterns are evident more broadly, in the raw data for the United States in 1930, as well as in
contemporary data across African countries.
Figure 8 plots the cross-sectional correlation across U.S. states in 1930 of pneumonia mortality
with each of childlessness and total fertility. Childlessness is negatively correlated with pneumonia
mortality, while total fertility is positively correlated with it. The Figure also shows scatter plots
of labor force participation and marital status against child mortality. Labor force participation is
inversely correlated with child mortality (though less pronounced than childlessness), while marriage
is positively correlated, consistent with our causal estimates.
Turning to contemporary data, Figure 9 plots the cross-country relationship between fertility,
labor supply and marriage and infant mortality (from all causes), across African countries in 2015.
Similar to the early 20th century data from the U.S., these contemporary data show a positive
correlation of infant mortality with both total fertility and ever married rates, and a negative cor-
relation of infant mortality with childlessness and labor force participation. These figures illustrate
that the effects of child mortality decline that we document using the invention of sulfa drugs can
be seen as broad correlational patterns in different time periods and different settings.
7 Conclusions
The analysis produces two striking findings. First, a decline in child mortality (driven by pneumonia
decline) led to fertility delay, a reduction in overall fertility, with fewer women having three or
more children, and an increase in childlessness. Second, the decline in pneumonia mortality was
associated with a higher propensity to work, higher occupational scores, and a lower probability
of having ever married. We argue that the two findings are linked, namely, that child mortality
decline made it rational to delay fertility, and that this led to the changes in labor market and
marriage outcomes that we document.
Reductions in child mortality allowed women to delay the start of fertility, reduced the total
time that women had to spend childbearing, and also reduced their target number of children due
to the effect of improvements in child health and child quality. They additionally reduced the time
that women, being main caregivers, spent caring for sick children. Together, this will have allowed
women more time for productive activities. For women in the labor market, positive shocks to
wages, negative shocks to fecundity or fertility preferences, or inertia, can result in persistence of
the childless state.
We outline a dynamic model of fertility and labor market choices that shows a greater propensity
for fertility delay and labor force participation in response to a decline in child mortality, when
the joint probability of promotion at work and child mortality is low. The estimated patterns are
35
consistent with this theory, fairly large, and robustly determined. We also document these patterns
in other time periods and contexts, namely in correlational plots in contemporary African data,
and US data before the invention of sulfa drugs.
The estimates are relevant to debates concerning the trade-off between career and family, the
rise of female labor force participation, and to models of the demographic transition and economic
growth. We provide new evidence on the drivers of childlessness and female labor force participation,
and the need to consider fertility, labor market and marriage market choices in conjunction. No
previous work appears to have proposed and tested the idea that child mortality decline may
influence labor force participation and marriage decisions of women, by triggering fertility delay.
Our findings are relevant for contemporary development policy. Although there have been
marked declines in child mortality in the last 25 years in response to worldwide mobilization and
increasing investments in public health, there is limited causal evidence of fertility and labor market
responses to these investments. Our findings suggest that investments in child mortality decline
can contribute to the economic independence of women, where labor market opportunities are
available. Women’s labor force participation and associated economic independence can lead to
increased investments in children (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997, Baranov, Bhalotra, Biroli,
and Maselko 2017) and a reduction in domestic violence (Aizer 2010, Bhalotra, Britto, Pinotti, and
Sampaio 2021).
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This figure shows the average pneumonia mortality rate by age group in 1935 in the United States. Source: Britten
(1942).
Figure 2: Pneumonia Mortality, United States






























1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
Year




















1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
Year
Under 1 Age 1 to 5
Age 25 to 64 Age over 65
These figures show the log average pneumonia mortality rate for all ages (left) and by age group (right) in the United
States over time. Source: Vital Statistics.
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Figure 3: Pneumonia Mortality Convergence Post-1937, United States
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These figures show the relationship between the 1937-1943 absolute change and the 1930-1936 average level of pneu-
monia mortality for all age groups (left) and by age group (right) across the states of the United States. Source:
Vital Statistics.
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This figure displays the marginal effects from logit coefficients and 95% confidence intervals around these effects on
the set of variables prePneumonia ∗ year where year is a set of dummy variables for the 13 years 1930-1936 and
1938-1943 (1937 is the omitted case). The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the woman gave
birth in that year, and zero otherwise.
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This figure shows values of pneumonia mortality across the United States that have been residualised in a state-level
regression by all the control variables included in the main regressions.
Figure 6: Numerical example: The effect of a reduction in child mortality on fertility delay
(a) Model with 3 periods (b) Model with 6 periods
The figure plots the critical values of the preference parameter A, which measures the strength of the preference for
children, as a function of the rate λ of child mortality. If A is above the top line in panel (a), it is optimal to get
pregnant early at t = 1. If A is between the top and the bottom line, it is optimal to delay fertility t = 2. If A is
below the bottom line, then no fertility (or, equivalently, delay until t = 3) is optimal. The region of delay becomes
wider as λ declines. Similarly, panel (b) shows the optimal regions of pregnancy timing for a model with 6 periods.
The parameter values are: τq = τe = 2, u(n, e) = Ae
αn1−α, α = 0.9, Y = 1, p = 0.1.
44
































0 1 2 3 4+





























0 1 2 3 4+
Dependent variable: Indicator for # Children = X
Coef 95% CI
This figure displays the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals around coefficients on the variable prePneumonia ∗
sulfayears in a set of five separate OLS regressions, where the dependent variables in these regressions are indicator
variables for having no children in the household, exactly one child, exactly two children, exactly three children, and
four or more children, based on the net fertility measure.
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Figure 8: Relationship Between Pneumonia Mortality and Fertility, Labor Supply and Marriage in
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These figures show the relationship between the average state-level outcomes of women in the different US states in
the 1930 census and the 1930-36 average pneumonia mortality rates in these states. Fertility outcomes are defined
based on net fertility and other outcomes are as used in the main analysis. The sample includes all women aged
18-50 at the time of the census.
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These figures show the relationship between the average country-level outcomes of women in different African countries
and the infant mortality rate in these countries. The source of the fertility, labor market and marriage market data is
the IPUMS International Database: all countries for which IPUMS data was available in 2000 or later are included,
and all women aged 18-50 at the time of the census are included. We chose the census year closest to 2015 for each
country. The mortality data are for 2015 and these data are sourced from UNESCO. Fertility is measured using the
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A Data Description and Descriptive Statistics
The mortality data is extracted from US Vital Statistics (Grove and Hetzel 1968, Linder and
Grove 1947, Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek 2010, Bureau 1943). In
particular, we combined and extended the data series collected by Grant Miller (http://www.nber.org
/data/vital-statistics-deaths-historical/), and by Seema Jayachandran, Adriana Lleras-Muney, and
Kimberly Smith (http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.2.118).
State time series data on logged state per capita income were downloaded from the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis website (http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/). Data on the number of
schools, doctors, hospitals, and educational expenditures per capita were taken from Adriana Lleras-
Muney’s website (http://www.econ.ucla.edu/alleras/research/data.html). These data were origi-
nally collected from various volumes of the Biennial Survey of Education (schools and expenditures)
and the American Medical Association’s American Medical Directory (doctors and hospitals). For
56
state per capita health expenditures, we used data collected from various reports from the US Cen-
sus Bureau. (See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6304?archive=ICPSR&q=6304).
The state level data is matched to individual data by women’s birth state.
The main outcome variables are constructed as follows.
 Net total fertility is the total number of own children living in the household. Net childlessness
is a variable equal to one when this is zero and equal to zero otherwise.
 Gross total fertility is the total number of live births the woman ever had. Gross childlessness
is a variable equal to one when this is zero and equal to zero otherwise. The number of live
births was a question asked to ever-married women in the 1940 and 1950 censuses and to all
women in subsequent censuses.
 The intensive margin of fertility for both of these measures is defined as total fertility condi-
tional on not being childless; hence, this variable takes a missing value for childless women.
 The variable Working takes a value of one if the woman reports working at the time of the
census and zero otherwise.
 The variable In Labor Force takes a value of one if the woman reports she is in the labor force
at the time of the census.
 Personal income is the reported own income from all sources in the last year. It is available
for the 1950 census and onwards.
 The Hauser and Warren Socioeconomic Index (H-W SEI) is a measure of occupational status
based on earnings and education. It assigns a measure of prestige to each occupation. See
ipums.org for a detailed explanation of its construction. It is available for the 1950 census and
onwards. We also considered occscore from the IPUMS data and the Duncan socioeconomic
score as outcomes, with similar results.
 Hours worked is the reported number of hours worked in the past week. The original data
is an intervalled variable and it is converted to a continuous variable using the midpoint of
each interval.
 The variable Currently married takes the value one if a woman is married at the time of the
census and zero otherwise.
 Ever married is a dummy variable equal to one if a woman has been married at some point
in her life and zero otherwise.
 Age at 1st marriage is the age at which a woman first married, only defined for women who
have ever married, and not available for the 1950 census, hence making the sample size for














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B Trend Breaks and Cross-State Convergence
We formally test convergence in mortality rates after the introduction of sulfa drugs in 1937. Table
A.4 tests for the existence of a trend break in mortality rates in 1937, captured by a linear trend
interacted with a post-1937 dummy variable, and shows that high mortality states pre-1937 had
larger declines in mortality rates post-1937.
Table A.4: Trend breaks and test of convergence in pneumonia mortality rates
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Pneumonia ∆ Log Pneumonia Pneumonia






prePneumonia ∗ post1937 -0.2940∗∗∗
(0.0459)
N 667 667 667
R2 0.7573 0.7988 0.8603
These are OLS regressions (standard errors in parentheses) at the state-year level. The dependent variables
are (1) the year-on-year change in Pneumonia, the state-year average mortality rate from pneumonia, (2) the
year-on-year change in log Pneumonia, and (3) Pneumonia. prePneumonia is the 1930-36 average state-level
mortality rate from pneumonia. All regressions also include state fixed effects, and regression (3) includes year
fixed effects. year is a linear time trend and post1937 is a dummy variable for the years 1937 and later. * denotes
p-value<0.1, ** denotes p-value<0.05 and *** denotes p-value<0.01.
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4 6 8 10
Maternal Mortality, 1930-1936
Figure A.1: Pneumonia and Maternal Mortality, United States, 1930-1936
This figure shows the relationship between the average pneumonia and maternal mortality rates in 1930-1936 across

















Figure A.2: Maps showing pneumonia and maternal mortality across the U.S.
This figure displays the average state-level mortality rates between 1930-36, with shading representing discrete cate-
gories of levels of mortality rates.
62
Figure A.3: Articles appearing in the New York Times when sulfa drugs arrived to the U.S.
63
Figure A.4: Event Study: Stock fertility, labor market and marriage outcomes as a function of
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Binned Years of exposure
Married
This figure displays the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals around these coefficients on the variable
prePneumonia ∗ sulfayearbins, where sulfayearbins are five dummy variables for years of exposure to sulfa drugs.
The bins are 0 years, 1-8 years, 9-16 years, 17-24 years and 25 years. The base (omitted) case is 0 years, the unex-
posed.
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These figures show the average state-level outcomes of women in above and below median pneumonia mortality states
in each census year, where this is defined based on average pneumonia mortality rates in 1930-36. Fertility outcomes
are defined based on net fertility. The sample includes all women aged 30-40 at the time of the census. The dashed










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.3 Additional Robustness Checks
C.3.1 Alternative sample definitions
First, we show that our stock model results are not sensitive to sample definitions. We reestimate
the net fertility results for 18-36 year olds at the time of the census (a child born to a woman
aged 18 would leave home at 36, hence this measure minimises underreporting of children who have
left home). These results are in Panel A of Table A.29. All the results are statistically significant
and the magnitudes are comparable to those in the main text. Panel B complements this analysis
by presenting results for gross uncompleted fertility; that is, gross fertility for 18-40 year olds.
The coefficients are comparable in magnitude to the main text, although they are not precisely
estimated; this is likely driven by the fact that the gross fertility question was only asked to ever
married women in the 1940 and 1950 censuses, and 95% of the sample in these regressions comes
from these two censuses. As the main results suggest that fertility and marriage decisions are
intertwined, restricting the sample to ever married women leads to a select sample of women.
In Table A.30, we show that the labor supply results are robust to using a sample of 18-40 year
olds and 18-60 year olds; as with the fertility results, the coefficients have the largest magnitudes for
the youngest sample. This Table also shows robustness to widening the marriage market sample.
C.3.2 Outliers
Next, we reestimate the main results but excluding New Mexico, which was shown to be an outlier
state in Figure 8. The hazard model results are in column (1) of Table A.32, while the stock model
results are in Panel A of Tables A.33 (fertility) and A.34-A.35 (labor and marriage markets). The
exclusion of New Mexico does not change the results in a substantive way.
C.3.3 OLS and Woman Fixed Effects
In order to verify that our results are similar in a simpler estimation model, we estimate the hazard
model using OLS (Table A.32). In the same table, to control for time invariant unobserved factors
at the woman level that affect birth probability and potentially are also correlated with mortality
rates, we estimate the hazard model with woman fixed effects. The coefficients are similar to the
main results in Table 1, but they are less precisely estimated.
C.3.4 Multiple hypothesis testing
Finally, in Panel C of Table A.34, we adjust the standard errors from the main results (Table
5) for multiple hypothesis testing. (We do not adjust the standard errors for fertility because
these variables are all defined based on one originating variable.) In particular, we implement the
procedure described in Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, and Tierney 2014, which adjusts standard
100
errors to take into account correlation between outcomes. The formula for the adjusted p-values is
pnew = 1− (1− pold)A
A = (1− c)#outcomes,
where c is the average correlation between all other outcomes in the group. As we only consider
two marriage market outcomes, this formula can only be implemented for the labor market out-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D A Model of Fertility and Labor Market Choices
D.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We solve the woman’s problem by backward induction. At t = 2, if the woman has a
surviving child at this date, then Assumption (4) implies that her optimal strategy is not to get
pregnant (a2 = 0). Her continuation utility in this case (ignoring her exogenous endowment, which
does not affect optimal decisions) is simply V1 (A). If she does not have a surviving child, her
continuation value is
max {y2, (1− λ)V1 (A)} ,
since she can choose to either get pregnant or work for wage y2. At t = 1, it is therefore optimal
to get pregnant (a1 = 1) if and only if
λmax {0, (1− λ)V1 (A)}+ (1− λ)V1 (A) ≥ E [max {y2, (1− λ)V1 (A)}| a1 = 0] (11)
For any A < A, where A is defined implicitly by V1 (A) = 0, the inequality in (11) cannot hold
because
(1− λ)V1 (A) < 0 ≤ E [y2|a1 = 0] .
This establishes point 1 in the proposition. Next, for any A ≥ A, we can use the facts that y2 = Y
with probability p, and y2 = 0 otherwise, to reduce (11) to
(1 + λ) (1− λ)V1 (A) ≥ pmax {Y, (1− λ)V1 (A)}+ (1− p) (1− λ)V1 (A) . (12)
As a function of A, the left-hand side has slope (1− λ2)V ′1 (A), while the right-hand side has slope
less than (1− λ)V ′1 (A). Since V1 (0) < 0 and limA→∞ V1 (A) = ∞, there must be a unique solution
A = Ā (λ) such that (12) holds if and only if A ≥ Ā (λ). We conjecture and verify that this solution




< Y . If this conjecture is correct, then part 2 of the proposition
follows, because it implies that pregnancy at date 2 after working at date 1 is optimal if and only if




= pY(p+λ)(1−λ) , which clearly
satisfies our conjecture and also establishes part 3 of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. This result follows by evaluating the probability of childlessness for each of the three cases
governing the optimal policy in Proposition 1. In case 1 (no fertility), the probability is clearly 1.
In case 2 (delayed fertility), the woman is childless either if i) she is promoted, which occurs with
probability p, or if ii) she is not promoted, gets pregnant and fails to have a surviving child, which
occurs with probability (1− p)λ. Hence, the probability of childlessness in case 2 is p+ (1− p)λ.
In case 3 (early fertility), the woman is childless if both she gets pregnant twice but has no surviving
109
child, which occurs with probability λ2. Combining these probabilities with the probability mass
of women in each case, and summing across cases, yields equation (7).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The first point in the proposition follows by observing that A is the implicit solution on
V1 (A) = 0. Since the definition of V1 (A) in (15) does depend on λ, it follows that A is also
independent of λ. aFor the second point, the definition of Ā (λ) can be alternatively written as





By the implicit function theorem, we have














= u (1, e⋆1) > 0, where e
⋆
1 denotes the
optimal choice of e in problem (15) when n = 1. Hence, we find that ∂Ā(λ)∂λ < 0 if and only if
1− p− 2λ > 0, which is equivalent to (8).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. This result follows by totally differentiating Equation (7) with respect to λ.
D.2 Price effects
In this appendix, we consider comparative statics with respect to child health shocks that affect both
the rate λ of child mortality and the prices τ = (τq, τe) of child quantity and quality, respectively.
In turn, prices affect the surplus associated with having n children. We make this dependence
explicit:
Vn (A; τ ) = max
e
{A · u (n, e)− n (τq + τee)}
Moreover, making the dependence of suprlus on prices and λ explicit, the value of A = Ā (λ; τ ),
at which women are indifferent between early and delayer fertility is now implicitly defined by
(p+ λ) (1− λ)V1
(
Ā (λ; τ ) ; τ
)
= pY (13)
As in the paper, we focus on conditions under which dĀdλ < 0, so that a positive shock (a decline
in λ) encourages delay. To analyze indirect effects of health shocks through prices, we model prices
as a function τ (λ) and consider changes in λ. We assume that this function is twice differentiable
for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that surplus continues to satisfy our parametric assumption that
V1 (A; τ (λ)) < V2 (A; τ (λ)) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
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The total derivative of interest is now given by45











We derive a sufficient condition under which the behavioral effect encourages delay in response
to a decline in λ:
Proposition 5 There exists a threshold K > 0 such that λ ≤ K−p2 implies
dĀ(λ;τ (λ))
dλ < 0.
Intuitively, a decline in λ has two distinct effects on the marginal cost of delay. First, it reduces
the marginal probabilityof childlessness due to delay, as long as λ is not too large. Second, there
is a counterveiling effect if the decline in λ lowers prices, which raises the surplus from having
children and encourages early fertility. However, the price effect affects the marginal cost of delay
in proportion to the marginal probability (p+ λ) (1− λ), and is therefore dominated when p and
λ is sufficiently small.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Taking logs of Equation (13) and using the implicit function theorem, we have
∂ log V1
(
Ā (λ; τ (λ)) ; τ (λ)
)
∂A



















We have assumed that women’s utility and τ (λ) are twice differentiable, so that the function J (λ)
is continuous in λ ∈ [0, 1]. We can therefore define the lower bound B = infλ∈[0,1] J (λ), which is
independent of p and λ. Now assume that p+ 2λ ≤ K, so that we have
1− p− 2λ
(p+ λ) (1− λ)
+ J (λ) ≥ 1−K
K
+B.
We can find a sufficiently small K > 0 such that the right-hand side of this expression is strictly
positive. Combining with Equation (14), and noting that ∂ log V1∂A > 0, we find that
dĀ
dλ < 0 for
sufficiently small K, which completes the proof.
D.3 General dynamics
This appendix presents a version of our model with general dynamics. There is a unit measure of
women whose life cycles consists of T periods t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. Women’s utility is U = A·u (n, e)+c,
as in the baseline model.
45We write ∂Ā(λ)
∂τ
for the derivative with respect to both prices, and ∂τ(λ)
∂λ
for the vector of derivatives of both






At dates t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1, each woman chooses whether to get pregnant, denoted at = 1, or
to work, denoted at = 0. If she chooses at = 1, she has a surviving child with probability (1− λ),
where λ is the rate of child mortality. If she works, she earns wages yt per period. Her wages are
intialized at y1 = 0. If she works at date t and earns yt = 0, there are two possibilities. With
probability p, she is promoted, in which case her wage rises to ys = Y > 0 for all subsequent periods
s > t until her first pregnancy. With probability 1− p, she is not promoted, and her wage remains
at yt+1 = 0 for the next period. If she woman gets pregnant at t, then her wage falls to ys = 0 for
all periods s ≥ t. This is a generalization of the stochastic process in our baseline model, which
captures the “job then family” pattern of the sulfa drug era.
At the final date t = T , the woman’s fertility is complete, and she takes as given the final
number of her surviving children n ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. As in the baseline model, we define the
surplus she obtains at this date as
Vn = max
e
{A · u (n, e)− n (τq + τee)} . (15)
We assume that this surplus is concave in n. We write n⋆ = argmaxn≥0 Vn for the surplus-
maximizing number of children, assuming that 0 < n⋆ < ∞, and V ⋆ = maxn≥0 Vn for the maximized
surplus.
We write the woman’s dynamic optimization problem in recursive form. The relevant state
variables are i) the current date t, ii) an indicator ℓ ∈ {0, 1} for whether the woman is still in
the labor market, iii) her current wage y (which is always zero when ℓ = 0), and iv) her current
number of children n (which is always zero when ℓ = 1). Suppose the woman chooses action
at = a ∈ {0, 1} at date t and faces state variables (t, ℓ, y, n). The state variables at date t + 1,
denoted (t+ 1, ℓ′, y′, n), are governed by the following laws of motion:
ℓ′ = ℓ (1− a)
y′ =
ℓ (1− a) y, w.pr. 1− p,ℓ (1− a)Y, w.pr. p
n′ =
n+ a, w.pr. 1− λ,n, w.pr. λ
The initial values for these state variables at date 0 are given by t = 0, ℓ = 1, and y = n = 0.
We define her continuation surplus, that is, her maximized utility in excess of consuming her
current wealth, by V (t, ℓ, y, n). This value must satisfy the Bellman equation




(1− a) y + V
(
t+ 1, ℓ′, y′, n′
)∣∣ a] (16)
with terminal condition
V (T, ℓ, y, n) = Vn. (17)
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We now characterize the solution. Notice that whenever ℓ = 0 at any date, we must also have
y = 0, because women who have left the labor market cannot earn wages. Whenever ℓ = 1, we
must have n = 0, because working women cannot have children. Hence, we can restrict the state
space to the following three regions:
1. The woman has left the labor market, so that ℓ = 0 and y = 0.
2. The woman is in the labor market with high income, so that ℓ = 1, y = Y and n = 0.
3. The woman is in the labor market with low income, so that ℓ = 1, y = 0 and n = 0.
In the following proposition, we present a general closed-form solution to the Bellman equation for
each region:
Proposition 6 The solution to the Bellman equation (16) with terminal condition (17) is as fol-
lows:
1. For a woman who has left the labor market, we have




 T − t
k
 (1− λ)n λT−t−nmax {Vn+k, V ⋆} , n < n⋆,
Vn, n ≥ n⋆
(18)
2. For a woman who is in the labor market with high income y = Y , we have
V (t, 1, Y, 0) =
(t⋆H − t)Y + vt⋆H , t < t⋆H ,V (t, 0, 0, 0) , t ≥ t⋆H (19)
where t⋆H is the lowest integer t that satisfies
V (t, 0, 0, 0) ≥ Y + V (t+ 1, 0, 0, 0) (20)
3. For a woman who is in the labor market with low income y = 0, we have the recursion
V (t, 1, 0, 0) =
pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p)V (t, 1, 0, 0) , t < t⋆L,V (t, 0, 0, 0) , t ≥ t⋆L, (21)
where t⋆L ≤ t⋆H is the lowest integer t that satisfies
V (t, 0, 0, 0) ≥ pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p)V (t+ 1, 0, 0, 0) (22)
The intuition is as follows. For point 1, a woman who has left the labor market optimally gets
pregnant if and only if she has not reached the surplus-maximizing number of children n⋆. Her
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continuation value is therefore is the expectation of the maximal surplus she can achieve in T − t
trials of pregnancy. Evaluating the associated (binomial) probabilities yields Equation (18). For
point 2, we guess and verify that a woman with high income chooses a cutoff rule, and gets pregnant
after a threshold date t⋆H . The intuition for this cutoff strategy is that, because the surplus Vn is
concave in n, the marginal cost of delaying fertility by one more period is increasing over time,
while the marginal benefit is fixed at the current wage Y . For point 3, we guess and verify that a
woman with low income also chooses a cutoff rule.
This proposition immediately yields the woman’s optimal policy:
Corollary 1 The woman’s optimal policy is as follows:
1. A woman who has left the labor market chooses to get pregnant (a = 1) if and only if n < n⋆.
2. A woman who is in the labor market with high income chooses a = 1 if and only if t ≥ t⋆H .
3. A woman who is in the labor market with high income chooses a = 1 if and only if t ≥ t⋆L,
where t⋆L ≤ t⋆H .
Next, we evaluate the effect of changes in the child mortality rate λ on the woman’s strategy. For
comparison with the baseline model, we concentrate on extensive margin effects. We characterize
the effects on λ on the optimal timing of fertility among women who have not been promoted.46





then the threshold t⋆L that determine the optimal timing of fertility is decreasing in λ. Conversely,
a decline in λ encourages women who have not been promoted to delay their fertility. Moreover, a
woman who is indifferent between starting her fertility and waiting at t = t⋆L will choose t = t
⋆
L + 1
after a marginal decline in λ.
We conclude that a decline in λ leads to delay across the board, i.e., regardless of the initial optimal
choice of fertility, under the same upper bound on λ as in the baseline model.
Proof of Proposition 6 Proof. We derive the expression for value function in point 1 directly
by characterizing the woman’s optimal behavior. Then, we verify that the conjectured solutions in
points 2 and 3 satisfy the Bellman equation.
Point 1 : For a woman who has left the labor market, it is clearly optimal to get pregnant if
and only if n < n⋆. Hence, if n ≥ n⋆ at date t, the woman does not get pregnant at any date s ≥ t,
and enjoys surpus Vn at the final date. If n < n
⋆ at date t, we can model the woman’s potential
number of live births as a latent binomial random variable with T − t trials and success probability
46An equivalent result for women who have been promoted is available, as long as these women optimally get
pregnant at least once, with t⋆H < T . Promoted women who never get pregnant (t
⋆
H = T ) may switch to trying once
(t⋆H = T − 1) after a decline in λ.
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1 − λ. If the number of successes k is such that n + k ≤ n⋆, then she optimally gets pregnant
at every date s ≥ t and enjoys final surplus Vn+k. Otherwise, she optimally gets pregnant until
n = n⋆. Evaluating her expected utility under there probabilities yields the desired expression.
Point 2: Define the sequence
vt = V (t, 0, 0, 0) , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
as the expected surplus of a woman who begins her fertility at date t. Notice point that vt





, where k (t) is a binomial random variable with T − t








is increasing in the number of trials and therefore decreasing in t.
Moreover, consider the increments zt ≡ vt−1 − vt . We have







(1− λ)k λT−t−k (max {Vk+1, V ⋆} −max {Vk, V ⋆})

















decreasing in the number of trials and therefore increasing in t. From this result, it follows that
there exists a unique period t⋆H such that (20) holds if and only if t ≥ t⋆H .
We are now ready to verify that our conjectured solution V (t, 1, Y, 0) satisfies the Bellman
equation. First, suppose that t ≥ t⋆H ⇔ vt ≥ Y + vt+1. Then the right-hand side of the Bellman
equation is
max {vt, Y + vt+1} = vt
= V (t, 1, Y, 0)




vt, Y + (t
⋆
H − t− 1)Y + vt⋆H
}
We need to show that this equals (t⋆H − t)Y + vt⋆H . This is true and only if




(vs − vs+1 − Y ) ≤ 0
which is true because vs < Y + vs+1 for all s < t
⋆
H . Hence, the proposed solution in point 2 solves
the Bellman equation for all dates t.
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Point 3: We first show that there exists a unique period t⋆L such that (22) holds if and only if
t ≥ t⋆L. It is sufficient to show that the following is increasing in t:
vt − pvt+1 − (1− p)V (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) = vt − vt+1 − (1− p) [V (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0)− vt+1]
The first term, vt−vt+1, is increasing in t by our argument above. The second term is zero whenever
t ≥ t⋆H . When t < t⋆H , we need to show that the expression in square brackets is decreasing in t.
This is the case if and only if
(t⋆H − t)Y + vt⋆H − vt ≥ (t
⋆
H − t− 1)Y + vt⋆H − vt+1
⇔ vt − vt+1 ≤ Y,
which follows from the definition of t⋆H . This argument also implies that t
⋆
L ≤ t⋆H .
We are now ready to verify that our conjectured solution V (t, 1, y, 0) satisfies the Bellman
equation. We consider three cases. First, suppose that t ≥ t⋆H ≥ t⋆L. Then the right-hand side of
the Bellman equation is
max {vt, pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p)V (t+ 1, 1, 0, 0)} = max {vt, vt+1} = vt,
as required. Second, suppose that t⋆H > t ≥ t⋆L, which implies that vt ≥ pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) +
(1− p) vt+1. Then the right-hand side of the Bellman equation is
max {vt, pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p) vt+1} = vt,
as required. Finally, suppose that t < t⋆L, which is equivalent to vt < pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0)+(1− p) vt+1.
Then the right-hand side of the Bellman equation is
max {vt, pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p)V (t+ 1, 1, 0, 0)} .
We need to show that this equals the left-hand side, which is given by
V (t, 1, 0, 0) = pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p)V (t+ 1, 1, 0, 0) .
We are done if we can show that our conjectured solution satisfies
V (t, 1, 0, 0) ≥ vt.
We confirm this inequality by induction. It holds with equality at t = t⋆L. Suppose it holds at date
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t+ 1 ≤ t⋆H . Then
V (t, 1, 0, 0) = pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p)V (t+ 1, 1, 0, 0)
≥ pV (t+ 1, 1, Y, 0) + (1− p) vt+1 > vt,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of t⋆L. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7 Proof. If n⋆ = 1 then t⋆L ≤ T − 1 for all λ. If t⋆L = T − 1 then it
must weakly decrease after any change in λ. We therefore focus on t⋆L < T − 1. To show that t⋆L is
decreasing in λ, it is sufficient to show that the inequality in (22) is more likely to hold, for a given
t ≤ T − 2, after a marginal increase in λ. Hence, we need to show that the following expression is
increasing in λ:
vt − (1− p) vt+1 − p
[
(t⋆H − (t+ 1))Y + vt⋆H
]
If t⋆H = T , then this is equal to
vt − (1− p) vt+1 (24)









= − (T − t)λT−t−1V1
Hence, we obtain that ∂[vt−(1−p)vt+1]∂λ > 0 if and only if
λ < (1− p) T − (t+ 1)
T − t
,
which holds for all t ≤ T − 2 if λ < 1−p2 .
If, on the other hand, t⋆H < T , then the expression of interest is equal to





plus a constant that does not depend on λ. The first term is strictly increasing in λ whenever
λ < 12 . The second term is the sum of increments vs − vs+1 for s ≤ t
⋆
H − 1, all of which are also
increasing in λ whenever λ < 12 . This establishes that t
⋆
L is decreasing in λ, as required. Since the
terms of interest in (24) and (25) are strictly increasing in λ, it also follows that a woman who is
indifferent between starting her fertility and waiting for one period at t = t⋆L (i.e., for whom (22)
holds with equality) will now choose t = t⋆L + 1 after a marginal decline in λ.
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D.4 Extensions
This appendix extends our baseline model in various directions. The associated economic intuitions
are discussed in the paper. Our treatment of heterogeneous preferences in terms of a single param-
eter A in our baseline model is not illuminating in all extensions, in particular in those with general
(not quasilinear) preferences and higher birth orders. For a unified treatment, in each extension,
we establish a more general version of our main result: A decline in child mortality λ expands the
parametric region in which delayed fertility is optimal.
In particular, in each extension, we derive the expected continuation value U1 of getting pregnant
at date 1 and the expected continuation value U0 of working at date 1. We then derive conditions
under which the following implication holds:
U1 ≥ U0 ⇒
∂ [U1 − U0]
∂λ
> 0. (26)
The intepretation of Condition (26) is as follows: If it is satisfied, then any woman who prefers
early fertility for a low value of λ will also prefer it for a higher value of λ. Moreover, if a woman
is indifferent between delayed and early fertility, then she strictly preferes delayed fertility after a
marginal decrease in λ. Hence, establishing (26) is sufficient to argue that a decline in λ encourages
a wider set of women to delay.
D.4.1 Income effects
In this section, we make two generalizations to our baseline model. First, the woman’s utility takes
the general shape U (n, e, c), where U (.) is concave in its three arguments. We assume that the
marginal utility of consumption is weakly increasing in both quality and quantity of children:
∂2U
∂c∂n




Second, to generate meaningful income effects between dates 1 and 2, we now allow the woman’s
wage before promotion to take a non-zero value y > 0.
We define the woman’s total income as m ≡
∑2
t=1 yt (1− at). The indirect utility of having n
children and earning total income m is
Vn (m) = max
e,c
{U (n, e, c) subject to c+ n (τq + τee) = m} . (28)
We further define the surplus from having n relative to having no children with income m as
Sn (m) = Vn (m)− V0 (m) .
We will make use of the following intermediate results
Lemma 1 The indirect utility function Vn (m) is concave in m.
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Lemma 2 The surplus from one child satisfies
S1 (y) ≥ S1 (0) .
We characterize the conditions under which declines in λ encourage delay.







then Condition (26) is satisfied, and a decline in λ encourages a wider set of women to delay.
We can compare Condition (29), under which a decline in λ encourages delay, to the equivalent
condition in the baseline model without income effects, which is
λ ≤ 1− p
2
.
It is clear that the Condition (29) is weaker, meaning that switches to delay in response to declines
in λ are (weakly) more likely when there are income effects, because S1 (y) ≥ S1 (0), as implied by
Lemma (2).
Proof of Lemma 1 Proof. Fix n, and let (c, e) nnd (c′, e′) be the solutions to the maximization
problem in (28) when income is m and m′, respectively. Let m′′ = µm + (1− µ)m′ for some µ ∈
[0, 1]. Since the budget constraint is linear for a given n, the choice (c′′, e′′), with c′′ = µc+(1− µ) c′



















where the second inequality follows from the concavity of U(.).
Proof of Lemma 2 Proof. We need to show that V1 (y)−V0 (y) ≥ V1 (0)−V0 (0), or equivalently:
V1 (y)− V1 (0) ≥ V0 (y)− V0 (0)





,m ∈ [0, y] (30)
Let cn be optimal consumption, en optimal child quality, and λn the Lagrange multiplier on the
woman’s budget constraint, when the woman has n children at t = 3. Let e0 = 0 without loss of
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generality. Now (30) redues to
λ1 ≥ λ0
⇔∂U (c1, 1, e1)
∂c
≥ ∂U (c0, 0, 0)
∂c
The woman’s budget constraint yields c1 = c0− τq − τee0 < c0. If U(.) is concave and satisfies (27),
we obtain
∂U (c1, 1, e1)
∂c
≥ ∂U (c0, 1, e1)
∂c
≥ ∂U (c0, 0, 0)
∂c
,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8 Proof. To establish Condition (26), suppose that U0 ≥ U1. We can
write
U1 = V0 (0) + (1 + λ) (1− λ)S1 (0)
U0 = pmax {V0 (y + Y ) , V0 (y) + (1− λ)S1 (y)}
+ (1− p)max {V0 (2y) , V0 (y) + (1− λ)S1 (y)} (31)
Notice that
0 ≤ U1 − U0
≤ V0 (0) + 2 (1− λ)S1 (0)− V0 (2y)
⇒ V0 (2y)− V0 (0) ≤ 2 (1− λ)S1 (0)
Since V0 (.) is concave we also have V0 (2y) − V0 (0) ≥ 2 [V0 (2y)− V0 (y)]. Using Lemma (2), we
find that
(1− λ)S1 (y) ≥ V0 (2y)− V0 (y) .
Using this inequality to simplify U0 in (31) and differentiating, we get
∂ [U1 − U0]
∂λ
= (1− p+ pδ)S1 (y)− 2λS1 (0) ,
where δ = 1 {V0 (y + Y ) ≤ V0 (y) + (1− λ)S1 (y)} ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for whether the woman







Since δ ≥ 0, the bound in (29) is sufficient for Condition (26), which completes the proof.
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D.4.2 Higher birth orders
In this section, we consider women for whom it may be optimal to have two children. We replace
our assumption that V1 (A) < V2 (A), which guaranteed that at most one child was optimal in the
baseline model, with the weaker assumption that the surplus from having children is concave in
the quantity of children. Concretely, in the three period model, we assume that:
V1 (A)− V0 (A) ≥ V2 (A)− V1 (A) ,∀A ≥ 0. (32)
For example, with a Cobb-Douglas utility function u (n, e) = eαn1−α, this is always satisfied if
α ≤ 12 , while at most one child is always optimal when α >
1
2 .
We characterize the conditions under which declines in λ encourage delay.













V2 (A)− V1 (A)




then Condition (26) is satisfied, and a decline in λ encourages a wider set of women to delay.
The upper bound for λ in Condition (33) is tighter than the equivalent in the baseline model, which
is
λ ≤ 1− p
2
.
In particular, the right-hand side of (33) is decreasing in ∆ (A). This quantity, defined in (34),
measures the strength of a woman’s preference for a second child, relative to her preference for
her first child. If a woman does not benefit from having a second child at all, then ∆ (A) = 0.
Otherwise, ∆ (A) is a number less than one, due to our assumption that surplus is concave.
Proof of Proposition 9 Proof. To establish Condition (26), fix a preference parameter A and
suppose that U0 ≥ U1, which implies that V1 (A) ≥ 0. We now have
U0 = (1 + λ) (1− λ)V1 (A) + (1− λ)2max {V2 (A)− V1 (A) , 0}
U1 = pmax {Y, (1− λ)V1 (A)}+ (1− p) (1− λ)V1 (A)
Therefore,
∂ [U0 − U1]
∂λ
= (1− p+ pδ)V1 (A)− 2λV1 (A)− 2 (1− λ)max {V2 (A)− V1 (A) , 0}
where δ = 1 {Y ≤ (1− λ)V1 (A)} ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for whether the woman gets pregnant
upon promotion. To establish Condition (26), it is sufficient to show under which condition this
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expression is positive when δ = 0. Substituting δ = 0 and rearranging yields the upper bound on
λ in Condition (33) and completes the proof.
D.4.3 Increasing risk of infertility
We assume that between dates 1 and 2 in our baseline model, the woman becomes infertile with
probability ϕ, in which case her probability of childbirth at date 2 drops from 1 − λ to 0. In this
environment, the risk of infertility increases when fertility is delayed.
We characterize the conditions under which declines in λ encourage delay.





then Condition (26) is satisfied, and a decline in λ encourages a wider set of women to delay.
The upper bound for λ in Condition (35) is tighter than the equivalent in the baseline model, which
is
λ ≤ 1− p
2
.
In particular, the constraint on λ is more stringent when the likelihood ratio ϕ1−ϕ of infertility versus
fertility is large.
Proof of Proposition 10 Proof. To establish Condition (26), fix a preference parameter A and
suppose that U1 ≥ U0, which implies that V1 (A) ≥ 0. We now have
U1 = [1− λ+ λ (1− ϕ) (1− λ)]V1 (A)
U0 = p [ϕY + (1− ϕ)max {Y, (1− λ)V1 (A)}]
+ (1− p) (1− ϕ) (1− λ)V1 (A)
Therefore,
∂ [U1 − U0]
∂λ
= V1 (A) [δp (1− ϕ) + (1− p) (1− ϕ)− ϕ− (1− ϕ) 2λ]
where δ = 1 {Y ≤ (1− λ)V1 (A)} ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for whether the woman gets pregnant
upon promotion. To establish Condition (26), it is sufficient to show under which condition this
expression is positive when δ = 0. Substituting δ = 0 and rearranging yields the upper bound on
λ in Condition (35) and completes the proof.
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Figure A.6: Numerical example: The effect of a reduction in child mortality on fertility delay with
risk of infertility
(a) Model with 3 periods (b) Model with 6 periods
The figure plots the critical values of the preference parameter A, which measures the strength of the preference for
children, as a function of the rate λ of child mortality. If A is above the top line in panel (a), it is optimal to get
pregnant early at t = 1. If A is between the top and the bottom line, it is optimal to delay fertility t = 2. If A is
below the bottom line, then no fertility (or, equivalently, delay until t = 3) is optimal. The region of delay becomes
wider as λ declines. Similarly, panel (b) shows the optimal regions of pregnancy timing for a model with 6 periods.
The parameter values are: τq = τe = 2, u(n, e) = Ae
αn1−α, α = 0.9, Y = 1, p = 0.1. We assume in this figure that
the probability of a live birth at period t is (1− λ)(1− 0.04 ∗ t), which declines linearly over time for any given λ.
D.4.4 Marriage decisions
We assume that, at the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, the woman can search for a potential
marriage partner. Her search succeeds with probability σ. If she finds a potential partner at t = 1,
she can marry or reject him. Marriage implies that the woman leaves the labor market, potential
wages drop to zero. Rejection implies that she cannot get pregnant, so that her probability of
childbirth upon choosing a1 = 1 drops to zero. If she does not find a partner at t = 1, she also
cannot get pregnant. If the woman is unmarried at t = 2, she can conduct another (independent)
search for a partner, which also succeeds with probability σ.
A woman who has not found a partner at date 1 will celarly find it optimal to work and chose
a1 = 0. Only a woman who has found a partner makes the crucial decision in our model, namely,
whether to attempt early fertility or delay.
Consider a woman who has found a partner at date 1. If she marries him, it is optimal to get
pregnant immediately and choose a1 = 1. We let U1 be the continuation payoff from this strategy.
If she does not marry him, it is optimal to work and choose a1 = 0. We let U0 be the associated
continuation payoff.
We characterize the conditions under which declines in λ encourage delay in both marriage and
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fertility. This is the case if, in terms of the continuation payoffs U0 and U1 that we have defined,
Condition (26) holds.





then Condition (26) is satisfied, and a decline in λ encourages a wider set of women to delay both
marriage and fertility.
We conclude that the constraint on λ is more stringent when the likelihood ratio 1−σσ associated
with not finding a partner is large.
Proof of Proposition 11 Proof. To establish Condition (26), fix a preference parameter A and
suppose that U1 ≥ U0, which implies that V1 (A) ≥ 0. We now have
U1 = (1 + λ) (1− λ)V1 (A)
U0 = y + p [(1− σ)Y + σmax {Y, (1− λ)V1 (A)}]
+ (1− p)σ (1− λ)V1 (A)
The expression for U0 follows from the fact that a woman who does not marry at t = 1 has another
chance to marry and have children at date 2 with probability σ, which is the likelihood that a new
potential partner is found. Clearly, these continuation values are identical to those in the previous
subsection in the proof of Proposition 10, except that the probability ϕ of infertility is replaced by
the probability 1− σ of not finding a partner at date 2. The result follows immediately.
D.4.5 Career choices
We assume that a woman commits to a choice of careers at date 1. If she chooses a “risky” career,
then the process governing her potential wages yt is the same as in our baseline model. If she
chooses a “safe” career, then she earns y1 = 0 at date 1, as in the baseline model, but receives a
guaranteed wage potential yt = ȳ at date 2 if she does not get pregnant. We assume that
ȳ = pY + w < Y
Hence, the safe career pays the average wage of the risky career, plus a premium w. The safe
career has a flatter trajectory than the risky one, and offers no chance of promotion to a wage as
high as Y . We focus on the interesting case with a positive premium w > 0. Indeed, for w = 0,
the risky career is a dominant strategy because the option to leave the labor market implies that
the woman’s utility is a convex function of future wages. To facilitate the exposition, we further
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assume an upper bound on the premium w:




We characterize the conditions under which declines in λ encourage delay in both marriage and
fertility.





then Condition 12 is satisfied, and a decline in λ encourages a wider set of women to delay both
marriage and fertility.
We conclude that, under the same upper bound on λ as in the baseline model, declines in λ
encourage delay in the model with career choices. An interesting auxiliary result characterizes
optimal career choices:
Proposition 13 The woman’s optimal policy is as follows:
1. No Fertility: If A < A⋆ (λ), where A is defined by V1 (A
⋆ (λ)) = w(1−p)(1−λ) , the woman
chooses a safe career, and works at t = 1 and at t = 2 with probability 1.





then the woman chooses a risky career, works at t = 1, and gets pregnant at t = 2 if and only
if she is not promoted.
3. Early Fertility: If Ā (λ) ≤ A, then the woman gets pregnant at t = 1, and gets pregnant
again at t = 2 if and only if she does not have a surviving child yet. Her choice of career is
indeterminate.
Proof of Proposition 12 Proof. To establish Condition (26), fix a preference parameter A.
In this environment, the continuation value of choosing to get pregnant at date 1, in which the
woman’s choice of career is irrelevant, is
U1 = (1 + λ) (1− λ)V1 (A) .
The continuation value of not getting pregnant at date 1 is evaluated under the optimal choice
of career, and equals
U0 = max {U s0 , U r0} ,
where U s0 and U
r
0 are the continuation values of working at date 1 and choosing the safe and risky
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career, respectively, which are formally defined by
U s0 = max {pY + w, (1− λ)V1 (A)}
U r0 = pmax {Y, (1− λ)V1 (A)}+ (1− p)max {0, (1− λ)V1 (A)} .
Suppose that U1 ≥ U0, which implies V1 (A) ≥ 0. We must have U1 ≥ U r0 , which yields
0 ≤ U1 − U r0
≤ (1 + λ) (1− λ)V1 (A)− pY − (1− p) (1− λ)V1 (A)
⇒ V1 (A) ≥
pY
(p+ λ) (1− λ)
. (39)
We argue that we must have U r0 ≥ U s0 by considering three cases. First, suppose that (1− λ)V1 (A) >
Y . Then, U r0 − U s0 = 0. Second, suppose that (1− λ)V1 (A) ∈ [pY + w, Y ]. Then, U r0 − U s0 =
p (Y − (1− λ)V1 (A)) ≥ 0. Third, suppose that (1− λ)V1 (A) < pY + w. Then U r0 − U s0 =
(1− λ)V1 (A)− w ≥ 0, where the inequality follows from (39) and (37).
Hence, we have
U1 − U0 = U1 − U r0 ,
and differentiating yields
∂ [U1 − U0]
∂λ
= [1− p+ pδ − 2λ]V1 (A)
where δ = 1 {Y ≤ (1− λ)V1 (A)} ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for whether the woman gets pregnant
upon promotion. To establish Condition (26), it is sufficient to show under which condition this
expression is positive when δ = 0. Substituting δ = 0 and rearranging yields the upper bound on
λ in Condition (38) and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13 Proof. In the proof of Proposition 38, we establish that U1 ≥ U0
implies U0 = U
r
0 . Hence, the point with U0 = U1, at which the woman is indifferent between early
and delayed fertility, is the same as in the baseline model. Hence, the woman gets pregnant at date
0, in which case her career choice is indeterminate, if and only if A ≥ Ā (λ), where Ā (λ) is defined
as in Proposition 1 in the paper. Moreover, for A ≤ A, where A is defined as in Proposition 1, it
is optimal never to get pregnant, in which case the woman strictly prefers the safe career because
it offers higher average earnings whenever w > 0.
For A < A < Ā (λ), we have
U r0 − U s0 = pY + (1− p) (1− λ)V1 (A)−max {pY + w, (1− λ)V1 (A)}
At A = A, we have
U r0 − U s0 = −w < 0.
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At A = Ā (λ), we have U r0 = U1, and










We argue that at this point, we must have U r0 − U s0 > 0. This follows by considering two cases.






















− w > 0
where the last line substitutes the definition of Ā (λ), and the inequality follows from our assumption
in (37).




, U r0 − U s0 is a piecewise linear function of V1 (A)
with at most one kink, which starts strictly negative and ends strictly positive. Moreover, the
function has a single crossing with zero where A = A⋆ (λ), which must be on the increasing part of
the function and is obtained by solving
(1− p) (1− λ)V1 (A⋆ (λ)) = w.
At this crossing point, we must have pY +w > (1− λ)V1 (A⋆ (λ)); otherwise the function is locally
decreasing, contradicting the single crossing property. Hence, we conclude women with A < A⋆ (λ)
optimally choose the safe career and never get pregnant. To complete the proof, it is simple to
check using our assumption in (37) guarantees that A⋆ (λ) < Ā (λ).
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